TRUTH AND CONSEQUENCES:
THE FORCE OF BLACKMAIL'S CENTRAL CASE*
WENDYJ. GORDONt
INTRODUCTION
Blackmail commentary continues to proliferate. One purpose
of this paper is to show what we agree on. Its primary tool will be
to define what I call the "central case" of blackmail literature, and
to supply the connecting links that will allow us to see how various
normative theories converge in condemning central case blackmail.
Admittedly, the law criminalizes more than my central case. But
once we recognize that the central case is neither puzzling nor
paradoxical, it may be easier to handle the border cases that arise.
The Article first demonstrates why criminalizing blackmail
involves neither a paradox nor a contradiction, notwithstanding the
fact that blackmail law prohibits offers to sell discreditable information that the law would permit the seller to disclose without
penalty.' The Article then sets out the central case of blackmail, 2
the standard economic argument for its criminalization, 3 and the
4
nonstandard uncertainties that wealth effects produce in this area.
The Article then turns to its primary topic: presenting a
deontologic moral justification for criminalizing blackmail. 5 The
nonconsequentialist moral view best captures, I believe, the primary
reasons why courts and legislatures have in fact made blackmail
unlawful. I argue that most of the supposed ambiguities surrounding the deontologic case are red herrings obscuring the simple
nature of the wrong committed by the blackmailer. 6 I also defend
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this argument against challenges such as the libertarian view that
blackmail is indistinguishable from an ordinary commercial
7
transaction.
The final sections of the Article return to discussing blackmail
law from a consequentialist perspective, but with a twist: I present
consequentialist arguments for criminalizing blackmail based upon
the impact that noneconomic motives can have on the outcomes of
blackmail attempts, and the impact that law can have upon these
noneconomic motives. 8 I suggest in conclusion that truth cannot
be found in either the economic (consequentialist) or deontologic
(nonconsequentialist) approaches standing alone, but that some
union of the two is necessary for satisfactory resolutions of complex
cases.

9

I. THE NONEXISTENT PARADOX
At the core of blackmail law supposedly lies the following
paradox: Everyone has the right to seek money if he so chooses,
and a possessor of information is ordinarily at liberty to disclose the
information or keep it secret as he chooses, "but if I combine these
rights it is blackmail." 10 That is, it is criminal for the possessor of
information to demand money in exchange for not doing something-disclosing information-that it is lawful for him to do or not
11
do.
Though this may be a surprising conjunction, it is, strictly
speaking, no paradox. A paradox is "[a] statement whose truth
leads to a contradiction and the truth of whose denial leads to a
contradiction." 12 Suppose a judge stated that "blackmail is unlawful, and 'where a person has the right to do a certain act ... he has
the right to threaten to do that act' 18 unless paid." This statement
7 See infra parts IV.D-E.
8 See infra part V.
9 See infra notes 182-86 and accompanying text.
10
James Lindgren, Unravelingthe Paradoxof Blackmail, 84 CoLUM. L. REV. 670,
670-71 (1984).
n See id. at 670-71 & n.7.
12 Boruch A. Brody, Logical Terms, Glossaty Of, in 5 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY 57, 70 (Paul Edwards ed., 1967). Colloquially, a paradox is a surprising
conjunction-"a statement that goes against generally accepted opinion." John van
Heijenoort, Logical Paradoxes,in 5 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, supra, at 45,
45. Blackmail is admittedly paradoxical in this looser sense.
13 Richard A. Epstein, Blachmai4 Inc., 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 553, 557 (1983)
(emphasis omitted).
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contains a contradiction, 14 which completes half of the conditions
for a paradox. To constitute a paradox, however, the statement
must also yield a contradiction if assumed to be false. The judge's
statement will be false if any of its components 15 are false. But if
the second portion of the judge's statement is false, it leads to no
contradiction: If people do not invariably have a right to threaten
to do or not do the things they are at liberty to do or not do, then
blackmail's illegality is perfectly consistent with the larger pattern.
Hence the statement does not produce a paradox.
More important than the logical point is the fact that the second
portion of the judge's statement is false. Even if one temporarily
puts aside the complication of the blackmailer's monetary demand,
people do not invariably have a right to threaten to do or not to do
the things they are at liberty to do or not to do. 16 Perhaps the
mistaken opposite impression 17 arises out of a belief that the
liberty to do 18 an act is inevitably greater than (and includes within
itself) the liberty of threatening to do an act. But the right to do a
greater thing does not always include the right to do the lesser; that
is one of the lessons taught by the doctrine of unconstitutional
19
conditions.
14 If we assume that the judge's statement is true, then it must be true both that
blackmail is illegal and that what a person is legally allowed to do, that person is also
allowed to threaten to do unless paid. But if the second part of this statement were
true, then blackmail would be legal, which contradicts the first part of the statement.
15 The statement can be read as having three components: (1) blackmail is
unlawful; (2) persons lawfully can threaten to do or not do anything they lawfully may
do or not do; and (3) the lawfulness of the threat does not alter if coupled with a
demand for payment.

16 See George P. Fletcher, Blackmail: The ParadigmaticCrime, 141 U. PA. L. REv.
1617, 1618-19 (1993) (making this point and providing examples of illegal threats of
independently legal activity). I do not mean to say that the illegality of the threatened
action in a given case is irrelevant; in some circumstances, it may be a crucial factor.
My point is merely that the illegality of a threatened act is not always a necessary
condition for the illegality of a threat. Cf F.M. Kamm, Non-consequentialism,the Person
as an End-in-Itself, and the Significance of Status, 21 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 354, 370-71
(1992) (stating that factors that make moral differences only some of the time can
nevertheless suffice to support a moral distinction).
17 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 13, at 561 ("The general proposition that a party
may threaten that which he may do makes blackmail an anomalous exception to the
general pattern of both criminal and civil responsibility.").
18 In usages such as this, "doing" should be read as "doing or not doing"; to
repeat the language each time would be cumbersome.
19 The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions holds that even though the
government may withhold a benefit entirely, it can nevertheless be prohibited from
offering the benefit on the condition that the recipient forgo a constitutional right.
See Kathleen M. Sullivan, UnconstitutionalConditions, 102 HARv. L. REV. 1415, 1415
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In addition, threatening cannot be "included" in doing because
threatening possesses elements that doing does not. Most notably,
threatening to disclose induces action in a way that disclosure does
not,20 so that doing and threatening can have quite different
effects. This occurs in part because the two acts affect different
parties: any threat the blackmailer makes will be directed to the
person with the embarrassing secret, but any disclosure will be to
third parties. In Hohfeldian terms, a privilege 21 to do would be
distinct from a privilege to threaten since each regulates different
relations between different people.
Further, the blackmailer does more than merely threaten: He
threatens to disclose unless money is paid. 22 Regardless of whether we have liberty to threaten, the law often forbids us to commodify our liberties by selling them. Our liberties to make sexual use of
our bodies cannot be bartered for cash in most states; our right to
vote can neither be transferred gratuitously nor sold. The growing
literature on inalienability 2 makes clear that doing and selling are
quite different issues.
None of this should be surprising. In fact, much of the
blackmail commentary can be organized around these simple points
concerning the differences between doing and threatening. The
Lindgren thesis, for example, is that blackmail is wrongful because
the victim and blackmailer are playing with "someone else's ...
chips." 24 This utilizes the point that doing and threatening affect

(1989). The doctrine thus rejects "the view that the greater power to deny a benefit
includes the lesser power to impose a condition on its receipt." Id.
20 For the distinction between assertions of fact on the one hand, and, on the
other, "situation-altering" utterances and "action-inducing" utterances, see Kent
Greenawalt, CriminalCoercion andFreedom of Speech, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 1081, 1091-94
(1983).
21 For Hohfeld, a "privilege" is a liberty from governmental interference. See
Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 30-36 (1913).
2 A demand for money is only the paradigmatic case. The proscription against
blackmail may also include prohibition of nonmonetary demands (such as for sexual
compliance), which usually, but not inevitably, implicate additional concerns of
commodification.
23 See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, PropertyRules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,85 HARv. L. REV. 1089 (1972); MargaretJ.
Radin, Market-Inalienability,100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987); Susan Rose-Ackerman,
Inalienabilityand the Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 931 (1985).
24 Lindgren, supra note 10, at 702. The notion is that the information subjected
to bargaining may properly belong, at least in part, to third parties. For example, if
an unfaithful husband pays hush money to conceal his infidelity, the blackmailer is
receiving compensation while the affected wife receives neither information nor
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different parties. The economic "waste" thesis, associated with Daly
and Giertz,2 5 Coase,2 6 Ginsburg and Shechtman, 27 and Epstein, 2s argues that allowing blackmail threats will result in the
expenditure of resources in allocatively-fruitless bargaining and
in "digging up dirt.., and then reburying it."3 0 This explanation
incorporates the point that the dynamic effects of doing and
threatening can be quite different. The arguments of those who
draw upon the Bloustein thesis, that privacy should not be commodified against the will of the primary party,3 ' correspond with the

point that law often makes liberties inalienable.3 2 With each
explanation comes another refutation of the notion that criminalizing blackmail is contradictory. At this point, perhaps only a subset
of libertarians believe that blackmail law conflicts with other proper
33
patterns of the law.
Yet criminalizing blackmail still raises a number of questions.
In the hope of both simplifying and advancing the blackmail debate,
compensation. See id. at 702.04.
The analysis I offer of central case blackmail does not need to posit such
innovative rights in third parties, but instead uses traditional moral and legal
categories to show that blackmail does a wrongful harm to the person threatened with
release of his secret. See infra notes 80-148 and accompanying text.
2 See George Daly &J. Fred Giertz, Externalities,Extortion, and Efliciency, 65 AM.
EcON. REV. 997, 999-1001 (1975).
26 See Ronald H. Coase, The 1987 McCorkle Lecture: Blackmail, 74 VA. L. REv. 655,
671-74 (1988) (arguing that in aworld with positive transaction costs, it is undesirable
to devote resources to activities such as blackmail which produce nothing of value).
2
7 See Douglas H. Ginsburg & Paul Shechtman, Blackmail: An Economic Analysis
of the Law, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1849, 1865 (1993) (arguing that blackmail results in "an
industry the output of which is nil, although resources are consumed in its
operation").
28 See Epstein, supra note 13, at 561-65 (arguing that legalizing blackmail will lead
to the creation of industries which produce nothing of value).
2 See Daly & Giertz, supra note 25, at 1000 ("With any positive level of bargaining
costs, extortion will clearly lead to a reduction of social welfare since scarce resources
are utilized in the process of negotiation while failing to improve the allocation of
resources.").
30 Ginsburg & Shechtman, supra note 27, at 1860.
31 See Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to
Dean Prosser,39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 962, 988 (1964) ("In a community at all sensitive to
the commercialization of human values, it is degrading to thus make a man part of
commerce against his will.").
32 Se4 e.g., Harry V. Ball & Lawrence M. Friedman, The Use of CriminalSanctions
in the Enforcement of Economic Legislation: A Sociological View, 17 STAN. L. REv. 197,
205 (1965) (stating that "[t]he criminality of blackmail represents a social judgment
that one may not manipulate as an income-producing asset knowledge about another
person's past").
33 See infra part V.E (discussing the libertarian view).
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I shall indicate what appears to be the central case of blackmail, and
show why under either of the two normative views currently fighting
for dominance in legal scholarship-economic wealth maximization
and deontologic moral theory-central case blackmail should be
condemned.
Central case blackmail is both inefficient (the
economic view) and wrongful (the deontologic view). 4
II.

THE CENTRAL CASE OF BLACKMAIL

The "central case" which should inspire the most agreement is
where the blackmailer acquires information3 5 for the sole purpose of
obtainingmoney or other advantagefrom the victim, and where he has no
intent or desire to publish the information, except as an instrument toward
this purpose. The blackmailer's sole claim to this advantage rests on
6
his possession of the information as leverage.3
This central case appears in various guises. It describes, for
37
example, Robert Nozick's paradigm of "unproductive exchange."
Nozick argues that an unproductive exchange has these characteristics: (1) the purchaser would be better off if the seller had nothing
at all to do with her, (2) if the exchange were impossible, "one of
the parties to the potential exchange would be no worse off" than
if the exchange were possible, 3 8 and (3) that party does not
deserve to have the other party harm her.8 9 Clearly the victim of
my central case meets all of these criteria: she would be better off
if the seller of silence were out of her life, and if the money-forsilence exchange were impossible she would be no worse off
because the blackmailer would then not have bothered either to
acquire the information or to make a threat of disclosure. 40 (In
fact, the victim would be better off if exchanges of money for
34 Whether or not the blackmail act should be criminalized is a separate inquiry.
See infra part V.
35 Types of extortion other than blackmail involve leverage other than the threat
to reveal information.
36 My definition of central case blackmail does not include cases where the
blackmail is motivated by a desire to reform the behavior of the threatened party.
37 ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 84-86 (1974).

38 Id. at 85. For a discussion of the importance of this second condition, see infra
note 140.
39 This third characteristic is implied rather than directly stated. See NOzICK, supra
note 37, at 84 (distinguishing the case where "I deserved to be harmed by you")
(emphasis
omitted).
40
Jeffrie Murphy essentially utilizes Nozick's theory in defending the criminalization of such a case. SeeJeffrie G. Murphy, Blackmail: A PreliminayInquiry, 63 THE
MONIST 156, 163-66 (1980).
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silence were impossible.) As for the third condition, there is
nothing in the description of central case blackmail that suggests the
victim has done something to the blackmailer that would give the
blackmailer basis for a corrective justice claim against her;41 in
central case blackmail the threatener knows of a victim's discreditable act not because the threatener was himself harmed by it, but
rather because he sought out the information for purposes of
financial leverage. So all of Nozick's three conditions are met.
Kent Greenawalt's definition of "manipulative threat" also
captures the central case: manipulative threats are "threats of
action when the actor would not suggest or engage in the action
were it not for the threat itself and its linkage to a demand."4 2 In
such instances, "the possibility of [disclosure] has come into
existence only as a part of a plan to induce" the victim to act as the
43
blackmailer desires.
The central case also plays a central role in the economic
analyses. The entrepreneurs of Richard Epstein's "Blackmail, Inc."
are by definition persons who go into the information business
precisely to obtain material to use as leverage; 44 they have no
independent interest in disclosure aside from maintaining the
credibility of their threats. Instead they intend to bind themselves,
via contract with the victim, into not using the very resources they
have expended money to locate. Similarly, Coase 45 and Ginsburg
41 Although Nozick addresses the issue only obliquely, principles of corrective
justice suggest that the issue is whether the victim deserves to be harmed in this
particular way by this particular person, not whether the victim might deserve to be
harmed in some way by someone. See Ernest Weinrib, Causationand Wrongdoing, 63
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 407, 428-38, 444-50 (1987) (corrective justice necessarily requires
a relationship between doer and sufferer); see also infra note 130.
42 Greenawalt, supra note 20, at 1099. Greenawalt's category has some
divergences from central case blackmail that are not relevant for the instant
discussion.
43 Id. at 1098.
44 See Epstein, supra note 13, at 561-66. The argument here is perhaps more
properly attributed to Coase, Ginsburg and Shechtman, and Daly and Giertz. See
generally Coase, supra note 26; George Daly &J. Fred Giertz, Externalities,Extortion,
and Efficiency: Reply, 68 AM. ECON. REV. 736, 736 (1978); Ginsburg & Shechtman,
supra note 27. Epstein's argument against blackmail focused on a different aspect,
namely, the way a blackmailer assists the victim in defrauding the public. See Epstein,
supra note 13, at 561-66. Nevertheless, Epstein's apt image of 'Blackmail, Inc.,"
captures the imagination.
45 See Coase, supra note 26, at 674 ("It would be better if this [blackmail]
information were not collected and the resources were used to produce something
of value.").
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and Shechtman 46 worry about people expending resources in
gathering information they have no intention of ever using except
as a lever with which to extract an unproductive transfer payment.
Daly and Giertz make a related point from a similar paradigmatic
"The victim of extortion is forced to compensate the
case:
perpetrator to refrain from doing something which does not directly
benefit anyone and would not be undertaken save for its bribe
generating potential." 47 The reasons why the economists view
such a central case as wasteful are fairly obvious, and are briefly
spelled out in the next section.
III. A CONSEQUENTIALIST PERSPECTIVE
A. The Economic Argument: Allocative and
Nonallocative Effects
The common law does not ordinarily allow persons to bring suit
for recompense when they take actions that avert harm to others.
48
Among other things, such suits would be difficult to implement,
would involve high administrative costs, and could, because of
problems such as valuation, impose net harms on the supposed
49
recipients of the harm-reducing activity.
Ordinarily, however, persons are permitted to bargain over the
potentially harmful acts they are free to perform, 50 and by contract
46 See Ginsburg & Shechtman, supra note 27, at 1859.
47 Daly & Giertz, supra note 44, at 736; see also Daly & Giertz, supra note 25 (by
implication).
48 Consider, for example, the difficult question of how to determine the amount
of monetary recovery a harm-avoider should receive. If the court were to use as a
measure the amount of damage the claimant refrained from inflicting, it would not
only introduce intractable evidentiary problems (how badly would the claimant have
acted?), but could also encourage potential claimants to create a record of prior bad
acts, to provide themselves with a plausible baseline for seeking reward. In addition,
there are probably intractable problems of coordination in choosing the proper
persons to encourage or reward; in some situations virtually the entire public is
capable ofclaiming that they have refrained from inflicting harm. For an exploration
of these and other implementation problems, see WendyJ. Gordon, Of Harms and
Benefits: Torts, Restitution, and Intellectual Property, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 449, 455-56
(1992); see also Donald Wittman, Liabilityfor Harm or Restitution for Benefit?, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 57, 62-64 (1984) (illustrating the difficulty of calculating money owed
when one has a "situation of no damage" but rather the avoidance of harm).
" See Gordon, supranote 48, at 455-62. In addition, allowing restitutionary rights
for harm-avoidance could generate incentives for extortion. See id. at 457-58.
50 For example, a person who decides not to build a sun-blocking fence out of
consideration for his sun-loving neighbor cannot sue to obtain a reward for his
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can obtain recompense for refraining from those acts. Contract
provides few implementation problems, low administrative costs,
and less likelihood that a contracting party will suffer a net harm.
Most importantly, the allocative effects of such contracts are
positive, as is made clear by the Coasean rationale for allowing and
enforcing such contracts. From an economic perspective, it is
desirable to distribute both exclusive rights and nonexclusive
privileges where they are most "highly valued" (that is, where they
can be used most productively). But the law cannot make these
allocations perfectly. If a person adversely affected by a liberty
values freedom from its effects more than the liberty-holder values
its exercise, the person affected should be free to purchase the
liberty from the person who values it less, thus correcting the initial
misallocation.
Unlike the standard transaction, central case blackmail ordinarily
does not (and by definition is not intended to) trigger a reallocation
of the contested resource. The blackmailer does not wish to
disclose, but only to extract a transfer payment. If, as economists
Daly and Giertz assume, the amount of money the victim would be
willing to pay is solely a function of the blackmailer's ability to
inflict injury to her reputation, 51 and if the central case assumption holds that disclosure has no independent value to the seller/
blackmailer, the purchaser will probably purchase silence if
blackmail is legal.5 2 Admittedly, strategic behavior might sometimes interfere with the parties' attainment of this mutually
beneficial result. 53

But as a general matter, allowing central case

forbearance. He can choose, however, to negotiate over the fence's height, and
demand consideration from his neighbor in exchange for keeping the fence low.
As to those acts which the potential seller is not legally free to perform, the other
party ordinarily can bring suit to restrain or obtain compensation for them. Of
course, some willingness to pay for harm-avoidance may remain (due to the
inadequacies of prospective legal restraint and after-the-fact compensation), but it is
usually unlawful for a potential harm-causer to demand payment in exchange for
refraining from unlawful acts.
51 See Daly & Giertz, supra note 25, at 998 & fig.1 (schedule DD) (graphing the
correlation between victim payments and the blackmailer's ability to injure). Daly and
Giertz recognize that the real motivations may be more complex. See id. at 998 n.2
(recognizing the possibility that the victim could suffer a greater loss than "the
resources he gives up to the extortionist").
52 See id. at 998 (explaining the likelihood of "successful negotiations"). By
contrast, if blackmail is not legal, the victim has leverage with which to refuse
purchase. See infra part V.A.1.
13 For example, the blackmailer may overestimate the price the victim would be
willing to pay and "dig in" at an unrealistic demand level. If this happens, the
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blackmail in a world of positive transaction costs would waste
resources in bargaining or investigation without any allocative
54
payoff.
B. The Irrelevance of Lawful or Beneficial Nature
of the Threatened Action
The initial "paradox" involved the fact that the blackmailer
threatened to do an act that was itself lawful and, by implication,
beneficial.5 5 The foregoing discussion should make clear that the
beneficial or harmful nature of the action threatened is irrelevant
to the core economic argument against central case blackmail. In
central.case blackmail, the threatened action has no independent
positive value for either party. 56 What motivates the bargain

exchange of money for silence will not occur, notwithstanding the fact that the
blackmailer could have benefitted from selling his silence at a far lower figure.
54 See Coase, supra note 26, at 671 (same); Daly & Giertz, supra note 25, at 1000
(stating that extortion consumes resources through costs of negotiation with no
accompanying improvement in resource allocation, resulting in a net decrease in
social welfare); Daly & Giertz, supra note 44, at 736 (same); Ginsburg & Shechtman,
supra note 27, at 1863-64 (same).
Lindgren has characterized this argument as resting on the comparative
magnitude of the transaction costs involved in a standard transaction as compared to
a blackmail transaction.
See Lindgren, supra note 10, at 695-97 (comparing
transactions costs in "blackmail bargaining" and "legitimate bargaining"). He
therefore argues that the argument cannot be advanced without empirical proof of
how great the transaction costs in each type of interaction might be. See id. But
comparison among absolute levels of transaction costs seems besides the point, at
least as to central case blackmail occurring between economically motivated actors.
In such a nonallocative transaction, any transaction cost is too much. When the time
comes to integrate the ideal central case into a more realistic picture of costs and
benefits, then Lindgren's point becomes more relevant.
For some of the noneconomic distinctions between standard and blackmail
transactions, see infra part IV.E.
55 Note that the discussion here addresses the beneficial nature of the threatened
action and does not separately consider its lawfulness. That is because I am assuming
that in assessing the "blackmail paradox," the lawfulness of disclosure would have
meaning for the economist merely as an indirect indicator that disclosure yielded
more benefits than costs.
The analysis would be more complex if we were to take into account the
possibility that any criminalization of a threat to do a lawful act would itself have
negative consequences. For example, such criminalization may cause confusion or
erode respect for the law. I give no attention to these possibilities since I think that
criminalizing central case blackmail has no such consequences, largely because the
person on the street perceives blackmail to be a wrong; therefore, criminalization of
the activity evokes no sense of inconsistency. See Epstein, supra note 13, at 553
(referring to the "popular sentiment" for criminalizing blackmail).
56 The blackmailer may have some interest in disclosure in order to make the
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instead is that the action will have a negative value to the person
threatened which is greater than the null or negative 57 value it has
for the threatener.58 In such a context, it is in no one's interest
for the threat of disclosure to be carried out, and therefore, if the
parties are economically motivated, 59 making the threat will not
direct resources toward carrying out the threatened act. The fact
that the action will not take place renders unnecessary any assess60
ment of the costs or benefits of the threatened act.
C. Caveat: Dynamic Economic Effects of Legalizing
Central Case Blackmail
The above argument suggested that because central case
blackmailers will be paid to refrain from disclosure, their threats will
not result in an ultimate change in the allocation of the contested
information. Real-world effects will necessarily be more complex.
For example, legalization could increase not only instances of
central case blackmail, but also the number of cases where black61
mailers have affirmative and independent motives to disclose.
threat of further disclosure credible, but disclosure has leverage value to him only by
virtue of the possibility of his contracting with the victim. See, e.g., Daly & Giertz,
supra note 25, at 998 (including the "externality generating party" who receives no
direct benefits as one of the explicit features of their model). This leverage value is
thus not an independent positive value to the single-instance, central-case blackmailer.
57 Carrying out the threat may be costly to the extortioner, in which case the
threatened action is a net negative to both the victim and the blackmailer. See Daly
& Giertz, supra note 25, at 998 & fig. 1 (depicting marginal benefits and damages).
58 Strictly speaking, a blackmail bargain could occur even if disclosure were more
costly to the blackmailer than to the victim, so long as the blackmailer could conceal
this fact and "bluff" the other into paying for silence.
59 By "economically motivated" I mean to indicate that the amount of money the
victim would be willing to pay is solely a function of the injury to her reputation the
blackmailer is in a position to inflict, and that the blackmailer's sole motives are
minimizing his costs (of research and the like) and maximizing the payoff he receives
from the victim. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
If the parties are not economically motivated in this sense, then the analysis is
more complex. Such a situation could occur if "honor" has an economic dimension
that could dictate whether the victim rejects the blackmail deal. The standard
economic case on the "waste" of blackmail depends on the assumption that the
parties' demand structures will usually lead to a deal where silence is purchased.
60 For example, the model of the Daly and Giertz paper was originally intended
to address extortion by threat of violence. See Daly & Giertz, supra note 25, at 998
(discussing extortion). Though violence is action which is unlawful and whose
consequences are negative, the Daly and Giertz model equally well describes the
supply and demand structure of central case blackmail. See Daly & Giertz, supra note
44, at 736 n.2 ("It should be noted that the key feature of extortion is the use of a
threat to elicit a payment, not whether the threatened action is legal or illegal.").
61 Ifblackmail were legalized, persons or corporations might develop a systematic
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When disclosure has an independent positive value to blackmailers, 62 disclosure in a particular case might be worth more to the
blackmail entrepreneur than silence is worth to the victim. If so,
blackmail efforts may be unsuccessful, and disclosure (reallocation
of the information) might result. Such disclosure might sometimes
be more socially valuable than silence would have been. For
another example, Professor William Landes and Judge Richard
Posner have suggested that successful blackmail may have a positive
long-term allocative effect on resources other than information, in
that fear of having to make blackmail payments may induce
potential nonconformists to conform their behavior to majority
standards. 63 This observation applies even to central case blackmail.
Of course, the fact that blackmail may result in some deterrence
or disclosure is not fatal to the consequentialist case for its
criminalization. Persons will engage in blackmail only if they expect
the activity will yield a payoff in purchased silence-and all silenceyielding (nonallocative) transactions will impose transaction costs
that could well outweigh any beneficial disclosure resulting from
blackmail attempts that misfire. Further, the possible allocative
effect resulting from occasional disclosure or deterrence is not
guaranteed to be beneficial. Disclosure may have a social value that
is positive (for example, disclosing to the electorate that a mayor has
embezzled funds) or negative (for example, making public a secret

practice of blackmail, and they might need to establish a reputation for carrying out
their threats. See Epstein, supra note 13, at 562 (predicting "an open and public
market for a new set of social institution to exploit the gains" if blackmail were
legalized).
62 When this happens, such blackmail is definitionally outside the "central case."
Unlike the "central case" blackmailer, the company seeking to convince the public of
its power and ruthlessness has a reason to gather and disclose information that is
independent from the threat to the individual subject of the information. See Coase,
supra note 26, at 675. This does not mean one can exclude the credibility motive
from discussion, however, since the two kinds ofblackmail are likely to arise together.
From a deontological perspective, this kind of blackmail would be treated the
same as central case blackmail. In central case blackmail, the threatener intends to
injure the person who does not want the information disclosed. In credibilitymotivated disclosure, this person is an object of the blackmailer's harm, but so are
third parties (prospective victims) whom the blackmailer intends to harm. Since the
credibility-seeking blackmailer is disclosing only as a tool to aid him in unjustifiably
hurting others, the deontologic argument against him remains strong. See infra part
IV. 6
3 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4
J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 42-43 (1975). For background, see RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
EcoNoMIcs OFJUSTICE 231-58, 268-86 (1981).
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of no public import that causes deep distress in the family concerned, such as the fact that when the mayor was a child he was
sexually abused by a relative). It is similarly possible that blackmailinduced conformity might involve a net cost to society. 64 Also,
Landes and Posner suggest that efficiency considerations of
governmental versus private law enforcement may justify criminalization regardless of the extent to which blackmail could deter
65
inefficient acts.
The waste inherent in central case blackmail should lie at the
core of the economic analysis. Nevertheless, when an economic
assessment of criminalization needs to be made, instances of central
case blackmail should not be viewed in isolation, both because other
kinds of blackmail will arise that may be difficult to distinguish from
it, and because the dynamic effects of successful central case
" I suspect that institutions such as Blackmail, Inc. would primarily discourage

harmless behavior that happens to be nonconforming (for example, same-gender
sexual relations). Our society already makes harmless and nonconforming behavior
too expensive. If so, legalization would then have negative long-term allocative
effects, along with the previously discussed waste of transactional and investigative
resources.
One might argue that this is a contestable value judgment, and that as an
economic matter such costs are appropriately imposed on the nonconformingactivity.
For example, if the public disapproves of an act, it might be argued that the
"disutility" caused the public by their knowledge of the act's occurrence should be
imposed upon the actors as a sort of strict liability, much as the injuries that
hazardous activities cause are imposed on the activities as a "cost of doing business."
There are however several problems with such an argument.
First, determining "what is a cost of what" is not a simple factual judgment.
GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF AccIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 133,

133-73 (1970). The cost to the public of knowing that persons are engaging in a
disapproved activity is produced by a combination of the public's taste and the
persons' behavior. It may be more appropriate to let the public bear the "cost" of its
taste than to impose it on the persons whose behavior, when combined with the
public taste, causes the offense. An economist would probably ask, "who is the
cheapest cost avoider." See id at 135. Since tastes about others' sexual behavior or
orientation are easier to change than one's own behavior or orientation, I suspect the
public is a cheaper cost avoider in this case. My rebuttal here is, of course, a twopenny version of a now-standard utilitarian defense of sheltering consensual adult
sexual relations from legal regulation. SeeJOHN S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 91-103 (Currin
V. Shields ed., 1956).
Second, so long as the harmless behavior is not disclosed (and in central case
blackmail it would indeed remain secret), there are few if any costs to the public.
Reducing or increasing the number of potentially offensive acts would not affect the
costs to a public unaware of them.
65 See Landes & Posner, supra note 63, at 42 (indicating that criminalizing
blackmail may stem from "the decision to rely on a public monopoly" in criminal law
enforcement).
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blackmail may result in changing the behavior of persons who might
fear blackmail in the future.
D. Imperfect Knowledge
Given the above complications, it might be argued that allowing
blackmail data to be bought and sold is the best way to finesse the
economic unknowns. After all, markets supposedly incorporate the
decentralized knowledge of many parties to direct resources to their
highest valued uses, even when those uses may be unknown to
central decisionmakers.6
The Coase theorem teaches that in a
properly functioning market, absent transaction costs, people will
trade a resource until it reaches its highest valued use regardless of
where the government initially assigns its ownership.6 7 If transaction costs are reasonably low and if the theorem holds, it might be
argued that allowing blackmail transactions will simultaneously tell
us whether disclosure or silence is optimal and move us to the
optimal result.
However, in blackmail the transaction costs can be so high as to
preclude all the affected parties from making their preferences
known through the market, thus preventing transactions from
reliably directing resources to their highest valued uses. For
example, there may be a multitude of voters who would be willing
to pay something to learn that their mayor has embezzled public
funds. Yet a person who has this information cannot practicably
contact this mass of possible buyers; even if he could, freerider
strategic behavior could well forestall agreement, 68 particularly
when coupled with the well-recognized difficulties that accompany
69
any attempt to sell a secret to people ignorant of its content.
Because of these difficulties that are well known to affect markets
in information and other intellectual products, most of the societal

66 This classic argument is usually attributed to Hayek. See Friedrich A. Hayek,
The Use of Knowledge in Society 35 AM. EcON. REV. 519, 524-25 (1945) (arguing that
decentralized decisionmaking can often utilize knowledge better than centralized
planning).
67 See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3J. LAw & ECON. 1
(1960); see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Marginal Utility and the Coase Theorem, 75
CORNELL L. REV. 783, 783 (1990).
68 Such problems might be avoided if there were ajournalistic market that paid
for "tips" an amount equivalent to what the citizens would pay in a competitive
market.
69 See Gordon, supra note 48, at 475-77 (examining the difficulties that would
beset the seller of an intellectual product if he had no rights to prevent copying).
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benefits that could flow from disclosure are likely to be kept external
to the blackmailer's decision. If so, the outcome of dealings among
blackmailer, victim, and other possible buyers will prove unreliable
as a guide to societal economic welfare.
Even if the transaction cost and strategic behavior problems
could be overcome, blackmail raises an additional problem for
application of the Coase theorem. For certain fundamental
resources, the location of the highest valued use can vary with the
law's assignment of initial entitlements. These are the resources
whose possession can affect our ability to enjoy all other goods.
Plausible examples include life, sight, and one's standing in a
community of peers. The fact that the valuation of these resources
can depend on the law is a result of the "wealth effect" that
ownership has on one's ability to express one's preferences in the
market. 7' Ronald Coase himself realized that changes in the
allocation of rights concerning fundamental resources (such as the
abolition of slaveowners' rights over other human beings) could
affect the final allocation of goods even in a world without transaction costs. 71 Herbert Hovenkamp goes so far as to argue that the
absence of wealth effects is one of the premises of the Coase
theorem. 72 Reputation may well be one of those fundamental
resources with strong wealth effects.
The wealth effect phenomenon does not afflict central case
blackmail because, regardless of initial allocations, both parties
prefer nondisclosure and will negotiate to achieve it.73 However,
70

See infra note 84 (discussing the phenomenon of "wealth" or "income" effects).

71 See RONALD H. COASE, Notes on the Problem of Social Cost, in THE FIRM, THE
MARKET, AND THE LAW 157, 173-74 (1988) (commenting, however, that wealth effects
"will normally be so insignificant that they can safely be neglected").
72 See Hovenkamp, supra note 67, at 787. Hovenkamp also notes, however, that
the Coase theorem can be interpreted as having two parts: an "efficiency thesis"
which says that resources will end up in their highest valued uses regardless of how
legal rights are allocated, and an "invariance thesis" which says that resources will also
end up in the same uses regardless of how legal rights are allocated. See id. at 785.
Wealth effects are technically relevant only to the invariance thesis. As for the first
thesis, actors in a world without transaction costs will still reach efficient results even
if strong wealth effects exist, although what constitutes efficient resource use may well
be different when the allocation of legal rights shifts.
73 Regardless of who starts out with rights over the information, in central case
blackmail silence will be the end result of the transaction (that is, silence will be the
highest valued use of the information as between blackmailer and victim) because the
value of disclosure is not positive for either party. See supra notes 50-59 and
accompanying text.
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in the more analytically troubling cases where disclosure has some
independent positive value to the blackmailer, the wealth effect
makes the market an unreliable indicator of the location of the
information's highest valued use. 74 In fact, for those fundamental
resources which implicate strong wealth effects, one cannot speak
of the highest valued use except in the context of a particular
75
allocative starting point.
To illustrate how the highest valued use may vary with the
allocation of legal rights, assume for example that a right of privacy
shields a celebrity's disastrous secret 76 so that the celebrity has a
kind of ownership in the information. If a neighbor learns the
secret and wishes to make it into a docudrama to sell to the
networks, and if she needs the celebrity's permission to do so, then
the celebrity may be unwilling to give permission no matter how
much money the neighbor offers. If so, the highest valued use of
the information seems to be silence.
However, if we assume instead that the celebrity does not own
the information-if, for example, the jurisdiction's right to privacy
does not protect secrets of this type or does not extend to docudramas 77 -the neighbor who learned the secret no longer needs to ask
Where the highest valued use is known, usual economic wisdom suggests the
resource should be initially assigned to that use. Blackmail law produces an
analogous result: though it does not assign the victim a right to silence (for when
parties other than the blackmailer are concerned, disclosure might be the highervalued use), it instead prohibits the central case blackmailer from selling the victim
her liberty of disclosure. As between those two parties, the transaction is not
allocatively effective, since the central case blackmailer will always sell and silence will
always result.
74 Assume that the value of disclosure is positive for the blackmailer (e.g., she has
markets for the information in addition to the victim). If she has both the liberty to
disclose and a power to sell that liberty to anyone she wants, she will have a minimum
price beneath which she will not sell-and the person who is the subject of the
information may not have enough money or borrowing power to meet that price.
Such noncentral types of blackmail are thus potentially afflicted with strong wealth
effects. These blackmail cases are more difficult to evaluate from an economic
perspective,
for these instances may produce disclosures that benefit third parties.
75
To decide what is the best use for such resources, it is necessary to utilize a
criterion (perhaps "utility") other than the usual economic criterion of "value"
measured by willingness to pay.
76 Wealth effects strong enough to cause variation in highest valued use will occur
primarily with negative reputational information. Neutral or positive reputational
information is likely to have a constant highest valued use regardless of initial
allocation, except where the party concerned has a particularly strong desire for
privacy.
77 The docudrama issue remains unresolved within right of publicity doctrine.
Such a suit was reportedly brought by Elizabeth Taylor. See Tamar Levin, Whose Life
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permission. Instead, she may give the celebrity a choice between
disclosure or paying the equivalent of what a network would pay for
the story. Against this legal background, the celebrity is limited in
his ability to protect his reputation by the amount of money he
possesses or can borrow. If the celebrity does not have enough
money to outbid the network, then the highest valued use of the
information would now seem to be publication, even if all that has
changed is the initial assignment of rights.
As I have argued elsewhere, an economist should not give the
market her usual deference in situations where the allocative
outcome of bargaining will depend on the initial assignment of
ownership rights. 78 Of course, this argument suggests only that we
should not rely on the market to inform us what the best use is for
some kinds of resources; the argument does not itself tell us
anything about what the best use should be. Outside the instance
of central case blackmail, economists might well debate to whom the
relevant rights should be assigned. 79 Nevertheless, to the extent
that the market is unable to make determinate choices regarding the
highest valued use of resources such as one's good reputation, we
know that outlawing blackmail deprives us of relatively little in the
way of meaningful information. The only determinate answer likely
to be provided by the market is with respect to central case
blackmail: whatever the initial allocation, the parties will likely opt
for silence. As to that case, then, the market analysis provides
useful economic information, and that information supports
criminalization.
Is I4 Anyway? Legally, It's Hardto Tell, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 21, 1982, § 2, at 1 (discussing
Taylor's suit and the confrontation between the right of publicity and First
Amendment doctrine); see also Jane Hall, When a Life Is Public, How Much Is Private?,
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1989, § F, at 1 (reporting that Taylor's suit did not go to trial
and a planned docudrama was dropped "for creative reasons").
7
8 See WendyJ. Gordon, Toward a jurisprudenceofBenefits: The Norms of Copyright
and the Problem of Private Censorship,57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1009, 1042-43 (1990) (book
review).
79 For example, as between the news media and someone seeking to use his right
of publicity or his copyright as an instrument of private censorship, it may be best to
place the entitlement in the media. See id.

1758

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 141:1741

IV. A NONCONSEQUENTIALIST MORAL VIEW
A. Background

I suspect that policymakers prohibit blackmail less because of
economic waste or inefficiency than because they perceive the act
of blackmail to be wrong in itself. Yet the nonconsequential case
for blackmail's wrongfulness has not yet been clearly stated. In one
of the first and most interesting articles on modern blackmail
theory, Jeffrie Murphy suggested that the deontological case against
blackmail might have intractable difficulties.8 0
Even Robert
Nozick, usually thought of as a deontologic theorist, has grounded
8
his blackmail argument on the idea of "unproductive exchanges," '
a rationale that sounds in consequentialism and whose deontological
rationale is opaque. A number of commentators have asked why it
82
is wrong for an exchange to be "unproductive" in Nozick's sense,
83
and the literature has provided no apparent answer.
Yet to me the deontologic case against blackmail seems clear.
One person deliberately seeks to harm another to serve her own
ends-to exact money or other advantage-and does so in a context
where she has no conceivable justification for her act. Admittedly,
the sum that the victim pays a blackmailer lacks economic significance
because it is a "mere" transfer payment that has virtually no
systematic allocative effect,84 but from a deontologic perspective
80 See Murphy, supra note 40, at 162-63.
81 See NOZICK, supra note 37, at 84-86.
82 See Murphy, supra note 40, at 158 ("It is not obvious on its face ...
that
unproductive economic exchanges are immoral. Nozick gives no such argument and
I am skeptical that one can be given."); cf. Lindgren, supra note 10, at 700 ("If
blackmail is an unproductive exchange, it is certainly not unproductive in the sense
Nozick intends.").
83 Standing alone, Nozick's paradigm of "unproductive exchange" is an insufficient
explanation of blackmail's wrongfulness. But when it is subjected to a few alterations,
the "unproductive exchange" paradigm can provide a definition of "harm" useful for
the blackmail context. See infra part IV.E.2. The notion of "harm," in turn,
constitutes an essential link in this Article's argument that blackmail is wrongful
because it constitutes an intentional unjustified harm to a justified holding.
84 Transfers of income can have indirect allocative effects if the parties' respective
demand for goods shifts due to their change in income. See e.g., E.J. Mishan, The
PostwarLiteratureon Externalities: An InterpretiveEssay, 9J. EcoN. LITERATURE 1, 18-21
(1971) (illustrating the income or wealth effects that allocating rights has on the
valuation of environmental spillovers). While a loss of reputation would likely have
significant wealth effects, see discussion supranotes 70-78 and accompanying text, loss
of money may not.
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the transfer payment provides the key to the whole analysis. The
nature of the weapon the blackmailer uses to obtain her paymentthat her threat of disclosure is a threat to do something lawfultends to obscure this from view. But the fact that the threat relates
85
to the disclosure of information is no more than a red herring.
The blackmailer is concerned with the nature of the threat she
employs only in the instrumental way that a butcher is concerned
86
with what knife to use.
To demonstrate the irrelevance of the threatened act from a
nonconsequentialist perspective of blackmail, I will employ the
"doctrine of double effect." 87 Once the nature of the blackmailer's act is stripped clear with the analogical aid of that doctrine,
blackmail can be seen simply as an unjustified intentional infliction
of harm on another to benefit one's self.
B. Means and Ends
Economics, act-utilitarianism, and other forms of consequentialist normative inquiry take an "impartial" or objective view of reality.
Their norms are agent-neutral; the only question in such systems is
what outcomes should obtain.8 8 By contrast, there are dutyoriented or "deontological" perspectives that ask how outcomes are
arrived at. The deontological perspective is sometimes said to be
The money paid by the blackmail victim is likely to have significant allocative
"income effects" if, for example, the amount happens to constitute a very high
percentage of the assets or the income stream of one of the parties. However, if the
blackmail payment is not very large, its transfer will probably have no significant
allocative results; if so, from an economic perspective, it would not matter who owns

the money.
Even if the size of the payment is great enough to cause income effects, it will
be difficult to analyze the allocative effects in any systematic way. (Would the victims

of successful blackmail switch from Cadillacs to Tercels while successful blackmailers
switched from Escorts to BMWs?) Even if such income effects exist, therefore, they
would be hard to predict and thus not useful for an economic analysis of blackmail.
85 Manipulative threats may not even be communications. Greenawalt has argued
that such a threat is a type of action, and possesses a "situation-altering character
[that] takes it outside the scope of expression," at least for some purposes.
Greenawalt, supra note 20, at 1099.
86 The violent and unlawful nature of a threatened act may make the extortionist's
moral wrong more serious ("I will break your legs" as compared with "I will disclose
your secret"), but a threat may constitute a moral wrong even if the threatened act
is neither
wrongful nor unlawful.
87
See infra text accompanying notes 105-06.
88 My discussion comparing objective and subjective perspectives on morality is
much indebted to THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE 165-88 (1986).
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the perspective of the agent by whose acts the outcomes are
achieved;8 9 it is in that way subjective. To the actor, it matters not
only that the ultimate outcome of an act may be good, but also
whether she will in the process have to do an act that is wrong" and wrongness is not determined solely by reference to ultimate
outcomes. Rather, the core of the dominant deontologic view holds
that it is wrong to treat another as a means rather than as an end in
himself, "to treat someone as if he existed for purposes he does not
91
share."
To transfer unjustifiably another's benefit to one's self is
particularly wrongful, for it denies the fundamental equality of
persons so to prefer one's self over another. But under the strict
deontologic view, it is also wrongful to use another person to
achieve a beneficial outcome for many. This principle almost
certainly has some popular recognition; most of us would hesitate
to do significant injury to an innocent even if the result were to give

succor to an entire city.92 The duty not to harm the innocent is
considered a binding side-constraint on an agent's pursuit of good
93
outcomes.
89 Although some commentators consider rule utilitarianism a form of deontology,
see, e.g., Robert G. Olson, DeontologicalEthics, in 2 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, supranote 12, at 343, the discussion here assumes a Kant-oriented deontological
approach. Note also that the deontological perspective is only one of several types
of a~ent-relativity. See NAGEL, supra note 88, at 165-67.
Nagel states that "[d]eontological reasons have their full force against your
doing something-not just against its happening." NAGEL, supra note 88, at 177.
91Warren S. Quinn, Actions, Intention, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Double
Effect, inJOHN M. FISCHER & MARK RAvIZzA, ETHICS: PROBLEMS AND PRINCIPLES 179,
190 n.25 (1992) (applying a Kantian approach).
92 If this were not so, there would be little difficulty regarding Ivan Karamazov's
famous question:
Tell me yourself, I challenge you-answer. Imagine that you are creating a
fabric of human destiny with the object of making men happy in the end,
giving them peace and rest at last, but that it was essential and inevitable to
torture to death only one tiny creature-that little child ... and to found
that edifice on its unavenged tears, would you consent to be the architect
under those conditions? Tell me, and tell the truth.
FYODOR DOSTOEVSKi, THE BROTHERS KARAMAZOV 226 (Constance Garnett trans.,
1976) (1880).
Admittedly, there are many ways to argue that the perception that we are morally
constrained in such cases is false consciousness. Cf. NAGEL, supra note 88, at 186-87
(discussing whether any pursuit of objective ethics depends on false consciousness).
93 See NOZICK, supra note 37, at 28-35.
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From a deontologic perspective, blackmail is a harm that
impugns the worth of the targeted individual, 94 using his welfare
as a mere tool for another's advancement. Thomas Nagel observes:
The deontological constraint... expresses the direct appeal to the
point of view of the agent from the point of view of the person on
whom he is acting. It operates through that relation. The victim feels
outrage when he is deliberately harmed.., not simply because of
the quantity of the harm but because of the assault on his value of
having my actions guided by his evil. 5

Acts of unjustified intentional harm are thus the perversion of the
personal. Blackmail is one such act, 96 and as such is forbidden by
the central deontologic constraint.
C. Intent, Consequences, and the Doctrine of Double Effect
As mentioned, deontologic approaches usually stress the duties
that exist independently of the consequences they cause. It is said,
for example, that one person should never use another solely as a
means, 9 7 which can be taken to imply that no unconsented harm
should be done to another regardless of the good to be produced
by the actor's overall goal. Some deontological philosophers,
98
however, distinguish between direct and oblique intention,
between foreseen and intended effects, 99 or among effects that
10 0
vary in their degree of "closeness" with the intended effect.

94 Cf. Kamm, supra note 16 (exploring certain connections between moral duty
and status).

supra note 88, at 184 (emphasis added).
'6 George Fletcher argues that a crucial harm done in blackmail is the relation of
dominance which the criminal forces on the victim. See Fletcher, supra note 16, at
1626-28. His presentation persuasively suggests that the deontological insult-the
blackmailer's perversion of the relation that should exist between subjective agents,
that each treat the other as an end and not a means-has a psychological dimension
of great immediacy.
'N For instance, Kant writes that one should "[a]ct in such a way that you always
treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never
simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end." IMMANUEL KANT,
GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 96 (H.J. Paton trans., Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. 1964) (1948). Of course, Kant's views are open to many differing
interpretations.
9
' See, e.g., Philippa Foot, The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double
Effect, in FISCHER & RAvIzzA, supra note 91, at 59,61 (applying Bentham's distinction
between direct and oblique intent to the doctrine of double effect).
9 See Kamm, supra note 16, at 376-78.
loo See, e.g., Foot, supra note 98, at 61-62 (discussing formulating a criterion of
closeness); Quinn, supranote 91, at 182 (discussingHart's critique of "closeness" and
95 NAGEL,
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Where a consequence is not directly intended, 10 1 the deontologi-

cal constraints may apply with less force.
The usefulness of the distinction can be illustrated by looking at
the kind of puzzle that has long fascinated Guido Calabresi: Why
is it that our society spends much more to save named individualsspending a fortune to rescue a child who has fallen down a nearlyinaccessible well, for example, or a bridge worker caught under a
fallen girder-than we do on safety precautions that would avoid the
same amount of harm (or even more) to unknown but statistically
certain individuals?10 2 The most obvious explanation of these
phenomena is a deontological distinction between direct and
indirect intention, between the certainty of a known event and the
indefiniteness of the merely foreseeable: it is morally worse to turn
one's back on a known person with real suffering than to ignore the
103
odds that in a distant place an unknown person will die.
A key attraction of the deontologic perspective is its focus on
the relation between the actor's intent and the personhood of the
the doctrine of double effect). The various distinctions mentioned (foreseen/
intended, close/not close, and direct/oblique) are verbal attempts to capture similar

concepts.
101 The philosophers are using "intent" as it appears in ordinary language, rather
than as a torts lawyer would use the term. Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
an actor "intends" all those results which he knows his actions are substantially certain
to bring about. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1964) ("The word 'intent'
is used... to denote that the actor desires to cause consequences of his act, or that
he believes that the consequences are substantially certain to result from it.")
(emphasis added). For the philosophers, by contrast, mere knowledge that a bad
result will follow does not suffice to constitute direct intention.
102 See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATrITUDES, AND THE LAW:
PRIVATE LAw PERSPECTIVES ON A PUBLIC LAW PROBLEM 6 (1985).
103 The deontological view may also explain other puzzles. Jurors in tort cases
charging corporations with dangerous product designs may be more likely to find
liability and/or award large punitive damages against the corporation if its officers
had engaged in explicit calculations of costs and benefits. See e.g., Grimshaw v. Ford
Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 361-62, 381-83 (1981) (describing the aggravating
effect of Ford's explicit balancing of the cost of deaths from design features of the
Ford Pinto against the minimal cost of increasing the car's safety); CALABRESI, supra
note 102, at 184 n.322 (discussingjury's reaction to cost-benefit analysis in Grimshaw);
Malcolm E. Wheeler, The Public's Costly Mistrust of Cost-Benefit Safety Analysis, NAT'L
L.J., Oct. 13, 1980, at 26, 26 (discussing the paradigmatic Pinto prosecution "where
persons from virtually all sectors expressed their antipathy for the use of cost-benefit
analysis where safety is in issue"). This surprises many, for the tort system itself is
widely viewed as implementing a cost/benefit calculus. See WILLIAM M. LANDES &
RICHARD M. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 1 (1987). One
explanation may be that jurors share a deontologic value system: the more explicit
the decision a corporation makes to take an act that causes injury, the more that
decision constitutes a directly intended harm.
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other. To let the child perish in the well is equivalent to telling a
known person that she is worth less than the resources it would take
to save her; to fail to put covers on all wells delivers no such
message to any particular person. The former action is an affront
to an individual in the way the latter is not. 1°4 We identify with
the person who feels herself the victim of an intentional choice,
even if the choice is an arguably good one (for instance, foregoing
the rescue of one child in order to save the funds needed to avert
peril to many more).
The rescue examples deal with aiding. Blackmail is a case of
harming. The role of direct intent in assessing the deontological
status of harmful acts is usefully addressed with the "doctrine of
double effect."
Advocates of the doctrine of double effect (DDE) allow a
departure from the strong constraints of deontologic theory. They
argue that it can sometimes be morally permissible to do an act that
has bad consequences if they are outweighed by the good, 10 5 so
long as the harms are not directly intended. 0 6 To determine
104 Person-directed choices afford the choosers the ability to discriminate for or
against individuals, while random effects provide no such opportunity. Perhaps part
of the grievance involved in "direct" choices is that the known victim feels singled out
in a way that the random victim may not.
This consideration impacts on both equality and utility. Allowing person-directed
discrimination creates the possibility of unequal treatment; this possibility may in turn
lead to anger and revolt among those subjected to discrimination as well as personal
demoralization.
Kamm offers another possible explanation of why it might be particularly
important not to cause direct intentional harm, noting that "[i]f we are inviolable in
a certain way, we are more important creatures than violable ones; such a higher
status is itself a benefit to us." Kamm, supra note 16, at 386 (discussing the
significance of inviolability).
105 Sometimes the doctrine's effect is stated in an all-or-nothing manner. I find
Quinn's approach more persuasive:
The DDE... discriminates against agency in which there is some kind of
intending of an objectionable outcome as conducive to the agent's end, and
it discriminates in favor of agency that involves only foreseeing, but not that
kind of intending, of an objectionable outcome. That is, it favors and
disfavors these forms of agency in allowing that, ceterisparibus [other things
being equal], the pursuit of a great enough good might justify one but not

the other.
Quinn, supra note 91, at 181.
106 Nagel gives the principle the following interpretation:
The principle [of double effect] says that to violate deontological constraints
one must maltreat someone else intentionally. The maltreatment must be

something that one does or chooses, either as an end or as a means, rather
than something one's actions merely cause or fail to prevent but that one
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whether a harm is directly intended, DDE asks, "if the harm could
somehow be averted, would the actor undertake the disputed action
anyway?" "[A] man is said not strictly, or directly, to intend the

foreseen consequences of his voluntary actions where these are
neither the end at which he is aiming nor the means to this
10 7

end."
A standard hypothetical illustrating DDE compares strategic
bombing (done to win the war by destroying munitions factories)
with terror bombing (done to win the war by demoralizing the
enemy). It is assumed that the war is a "justwar," that both bomber
pilots know how many civilians they will kill, and that both kinds of
bombing will each kill exactly the same number of civilians.
The killing of civilians does not motivate the strategic bomber's
action and so is not his direct intent; we know this because if the
civilians were somehow protected from injury, he would have
bombed anyway. Under DDE, therefore, the strategic bomber in a
just war does not necessarily violate deontological constraints. By
contrast, the terror bomber would not bomb if civilians were
protected, for then he could not accomplish his goal of demoralizing the enemy. Killing civilians is thus part of his "direct" intent.
Therefore, even in a just war, terror bombing would be forbidden
under DDE.
Though the doctrine and its application have their difficulties,108 DDE serves as a useful tool for our purposes. The doctrine suggests that when one's direct intent is to do good, harmful
side-effects do not constitute absolute constraints against the action.
Conversely, in what one might call the "doctrine of single effect"
(DSE), when one's direct intent is to do harm, beneficial side-effects

doesn't aim at.
NAGEL, supra note 88, at 179.
107 Foot, supra note 98, at 61.
108 It is difficult to distinguish between directly and obliquely intended effects;
verbal acrobatics can turn virtually anything into an obliquely intended effect. See
Kamm, supra note 16, at 376-78. Were that to happen, a strict application of DDE
might cause deontology to collapse into consequentialism. For this reason, among

others, not all deontological theorists subscribe to DDE. See, e.g., Foot,supra note 98,
at 65 (suggesting that application of DDE may lead to incorrect results).
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have little or no deontological significance. "1 9 DSE recapitulates,
of course, the basic deontological position against using others.
With regard to blackmail, our task is to decide what deontological significance should be given to the fact that the blackmailer has
a lawful liberty to do what he threatens to do. We are also
interested in whether the deontological inquiry might (or must) take
into account whatever beneficial effects could result from successful
blackmail. 110 Under DDE, one asks if the actor would change his
behavior if the harmful effects were eliminated.
Under my
suggested correlative, DSE, one would ask if the actor would change
his behavior if the beneficial effects were eliminated. Using that test,
it appears that no significance should be given to either the lawful
nature of the threatened disclosure or the potentially beneficial sideeffects of blackmail. Were the disclosure unlawful or impossible but
the victim still capable of being frightened into paying, the typical
blackmailer would extract the money anyway. Similarly, were the
supposed beneficial side-effects of blackmail somehow eliminated,
that would make no difference to the blackmailer.
Under DSE, therefore, the blackmailer violates deontological
constraints if he threatens disclosure in order to obtain money or
other advantage because his intent is directed to the money, not to
the disclosure or beneficial side-effects that might be produced.
These latter factors are thus outside the intent of the blackmailer in
the same way the killing of civilians is outside the intent of the
strategic bomber: if blackmail's purported beneficial effects were
eliminated or if civilians were protected, the actors would go
forward.
109 If an actor's end does not violate the deontologic constraints, then under the

doctrine of double effect the existence of bad side-effects does not necessarily bar his
activity. This may help to distinguish blackmail from a boycott or an act of civil
disobedience. In such cases it may be that the end is good, perhaps because the
persons being pressured may be receiving their "justdeserts." Cf Fletcher, supra note
96, at 1635 (suggesting that it may be just to counteract the domination of one party
by reducing him to the position of those he has dominated). If so, these activities

may be distinguishable from blackmail because they may have a permissible or just
end, while the blackmailer's end is to do an unjustified harm. But see Eric Mack, In
Defense of Blackmail, 41 PHIL. STUD. 273, 281-83 (1982) (arguing that blackmail is
similar to boycotts and that neither should be criminalized).
Haksar distinguishes civil disobedience from coercive threats according to the

morality of the course of conduct the threatener will engage in if his threat is not
carried out. See Vinit Haksar, Coercive Proposals[Rawls and GhandiJ, 4 POL. THEORY
65, 67-68 (1976). My argument, by contrast, is that a threat with an immoral end can

be condemned as coercive without reference to the nature of the threatened action.
110 See supra text accompanying note 63.
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Since the blackmailer's end is harm, the act is not redeemable
by the possibility that some component of the means he uses might
be lawful or beneficial.1 1 1 Like the terror bomber, the direct
intent of the blackmailer is to do unjustified harm, and as with
terror bombing, such intentional harm is impermissible regardless
of the benefits that might also flow from it.
D. The "PropertyRight" Objection
One problem some observers have with blackmail law is the
absence of any "property right" that the blackmailer has violated. 1 12 Property rights are usually understood as a particular
subset of rights characterized by their transferability and exclusivity. 113 American law gives only very limited transferable and
exclusive rights in reputation. These are the "rights of publicity,"
which are effective against use of one's name or likeness in
trade. 1 14 Admittedly, these transferable and exclusive rights in
reputation do not apply to the kind of disclosure a blackmailer
ordinarily contemplates. But nothing limits actionable "harm" to
such a narrowly defined subset of rights. All that is needed is a

111 One can argue that if an "end" is intentional harming, deontologic constraints
will be violated even if a directly intended "means" is not itself harmful. For example,
a person who perversely enjoys harming those he has benefitted may give candy to
a child in the hope that the child will both enjoy the candy today and get cavities
later. Whether or not the child is later afflicted with dental caries, it can be argued
that the malevolent act still violates deontological constraints. One need not go so
far in order to condemn a blackmailer's acts, however, for his means indeed do harm
to his victim.
112 Cf. Mack, supra note 109, at 276 (discussing the tension between rights-based
and folicy-oriented justifications for criminalizing blackmail).

! See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 99-100
& 100 n.l1 (1977); A.M. HONORA, OWNERSHIP IN PROPERTY: CASES, CONCEPTS,
CRITIQUES 78 (L.C. Becker & K. Kipnis eds., 1984); Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld,
FundamentalLegal Conceptionsas Applied injudicialReasoning,26 YALE L.J. 710,746-47
(1917).
114 In most states, the liberty to use one's name or depiction is "property" because
exclusive rights to it can be conveyed to another. The turning point in the
propertization of this liberty is the case of Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing
Gum, 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953). The court held
that a baseball player could make a binding assignment of a "right to publicity"
encompassing the use of his photograph on baseball cards. Once such an assignment
was made, it was binding even against other persons whom the player later wished to
license and (presumably) against the baseball player himself.
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justified holding or a justified liberty. 115 If it is intentionally
116
harmed, some justification must be shown.
This is hardly a novel suggestion. In 1887 Sir Frederick Pollock
"asserted it to be 'a general proposition of English law that it is a
wrong to do wilful harm to one's neighbor without lawful justification or excuse.'" 117 The common law is full of examples where
judges protect nonproperty interests against malice. 118 The tort
of interference with prospective advantage, 119 and New York's
prima facie tort, 120 provide particularly striking examples of
judicial protection of nonproperty interests against activity where
the only purpose is to cause harm. 121 Even where malice is
115 See Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the
Restitutionaty Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 166-96 (1992) (discussing correctivejustice
as a substantive basis for property rights). American law has even premised property
on quite inchoate rights, such as the liberty of using one's labor. See id. at 152-53.
6 What I suggest here does not enshrine the status quo, both because of the
wide range ofjustifications that exist (giving rise to privileges to harm) and because
nonholders have many rights, too. The theory I discuss here is conservative only if
joined to the notion that rights must be negative, "freedom-from" rights. See ISAIAH
BERLIN, Two CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY 7-16 (discussing liberty as a "minimum area of
personal freedom" within which there can be no interference). But deontologic rights
can also be positive; consider, for example, Locke's obligation of charity, which "gives
every Man a Title to so much out of another's Plenty, as will keep him from extream
want, where he has no means to subsist otherwise." JOHN LOCKE, First Treatise, in
Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT § 42, at 170 (Peter Laslett ed., 1960) (2d ed. 1967)
(1690).
117 Philip Halpern, IntentionalTorts and the Restatement: A Petitionfor Rehearing,
7 BUFF. L. REv. 7 n.6 (1957) (quoting POLLOCK, LAW OF TORTs 21 (1st ed. 1887)).
Halpern's article is a general defense of the prima facie tort approach, which makes
tortious any unjustified intentional causing of harm.
118 One need not have a malicious feeling (spite, envy, etc.) in order to do a
legally malicious act. Today "malice" (under that name or under the name "prima
facie tort") is sometimes even used to refer to the causing of unjustified injury. Cf.
Dan B. Dobbs, Tortious Interferencewith ContractualRelationships,34 ARK. L. REV. 335,
345-46 (1980) (discussing the disappearance of an original malice requirement and
the uncertainty involved in the application of prima facie tort law).
On the possible role of intent-to-injure in malice, see supra text accompanying
notes 105-06 discussing the doctrine of double effect).
119 A leading case here is Tuttle v. Buck, 119 N.W. 946 (Minn. 1909) (finding a
cause of action where barber alleged that another barber was set up in a competing
shop solely to harm plaintiff's business).
? 0 The leading case here is Advance Music Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., 70
N.E.2d 401 (N.Y. 1946) (finding a sufficient allegation of a prima facie tort where
plaintiff music publisher claimed injury from defendant radio show sponsor's
unscientific ranking ofsong popularity). For a more general discussion, see Halpern,
supra note 117; see also Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8
HARV. L. REV. 1, 7-9 (1894) (discussing policymaking components in the judicial
reconition of a privilege to inflict harm, especially in economic contexts).
Perhaps the most vivid example, however, is provided by the classic case of
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absent, non-property interests receive some legal protection. For
example, no one considers mental well-being a "property" interest,
yet probably all states recognize a tort of assault, which requires
intentionally placing another in fear or apprehension of contact, 122 and many states now recognize a tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. 123 Some states even recognize a tort
of negligent infliction of emotional distress. 124 We have many
conditional rights in aspects of our well-being which are functionally
or by law nontransferable. Some of those conditional rights protect
nonproperty interests even against the malicious use of property
privileges that are otherwise well-established. 125 So it should not
be surprising if blackmail law protected a nonproperty interest.
In fact, to demand a property right as a premise for giving
protection against harm is topsy-turvy. Many theorists have premised
property on a deontological right against harm. For example, such
a right is part of the foundation for John Locke's theory of property.

12 6

Keeble v. Hickeringill, 103 Eng. Rep. 1127 (Q.B. 1707). The plaintiff had been in the
habit of capturing ducks who came to decoys he deployed on the water. The
defendant began shooting his gun to scare the ducks away. Since the plaintiff had no
possession of the escaping ducks, he had no title in them, and so the question arose
whether the plaintiff had a sufficient interest in the prospective ducks to bring suit
against someone who seemed to have no reason but malice for depriving him of that
prospective advantage. Plaintiff's nonproperty interest was held sufficient to give him
a right of action against unjustified harm. See id. at 1127-29.
1
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 21 (1965).
123 See, e.g., George v. Jordan Marsh Co., 268 N.E.2d 915, 921 (Mass. 1971)
(finding a cause of action where plaintiff suffered two heart attacks following
harassment by a collection agency); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46
(1965).
124 See, e.g., Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 914-25 (Cal. 1968) (en banc) (allowing
recovery for emotional distress to a mother who saw her child struck and killed by an
automobile). But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A (1965) (finding no
liability for negligent infliction of emotional disturbance absent physical harm).
125 Consider, for example, the spite fence cases. There the court protects a
neighbor's nonproperty interest in, e.g., an unobstructed view, against a neighbor's
malicious attempt to block it off. Were the fence builder to have a reason to build
other than causing injury, then the court would not give the neighbor's view any
protection. See, e.g., Roper v. Durham, 353 S.E.2d 476, 478 (Ga. 1987) (finding that
possible malicious intent was insufficient tojustify removal of a fence when the fence
was also installed to mark the property's boundary).
126 See Second Treatise §§ 25-51, in LOCKE, supra note 116. For a discussion
arguing that Lockean property concepts are dependent upon an underlying right
against harm, see WendyJ. Gordon, A PropertyRight in Self-Expression: Equality and
Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE LJ. 1533, 1540-49
(1993). For discussion of a similar connection from the perspective of corrective
justice, see Gordon, supra note 115, at 180-96, 207-10, 238-48.
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Something like the "property rights" objection is sometimes
attributed to Jeffrie Murphy, 12 7 but Professor Murphy has a more
subtle difficulty with the liberal defense of blackmail law: he cannot
see that the victim has had any rights violated. In particular,
Murphy writes, a person who has done something discreditable has
no right to a good reputation, so he has no ground for complaint
if a blackmailer threatens to make discreditable but true disclosures.1 28 Using the language of corrective justice, Murphy seems
to think that a deontological case cannot be made against blackmail
because the victim's reputation is not a justified holding.
But the question of whether one has a "right to a good reputation" is irrelevant with regard to central case blackmail, for the
deontological point is whether the victim has a right to be free from
the harm that the other party intended and imposed. The harm
intended and imposed in central case blackmail is not harm to
reputation; it is harm to the victim's pocketbook or to her liberty.
The central case blackmailer does not seek to place the victim's
reputation at its "proper" level, 129 nor is that the usual effect of his
actions.13 0 Rather, he seeks to extract something from the victim
that is properly the victim's, usually money, or to make the victim
do something (for example, sleep with him) that is ordinarily a
behavior that the victim is at liberty not to engage in. The missing
"rights" that Murphy seeks are therefore present and fairly noncontroversial: the rights not to have one's goods intentionally taken, or
have one's liberty intentionally infringed, without justification.
It is irrelevant whether or not it would be proper for the
blackmailer to disclose the information, and thus destroy something
See Mack, supra note 109, at 274-75 (criticizing the Murphy position).
See Murphy, supra note 40, at 162 ("It is unclear to me how you can have a
right to the reputation of being a person of type X if in fact you have performed acts
of type Y where Y acts are inconsistent with being an X person."); see also Lindgren,
supra note 10, at 699-700.
129 See Murphy, supra note 40, at 162.
IS0 Further, whether the victim deserves to have thispersonharm him is a different
question from whether the victim deserves the harm in general. Considerations of
corrective justice suggest that wrongful gains should be disgorged only to the
individuals to whom redress is due, see Weinrib, supra note 41, at 429-50, or perhaps
to the state. "Thus if A negligently injures X and B negligently injures Y, X cannot
recover from B nor Y from A even if both injuries are identically quantifiable." Id.
at 429. But seeJules L. Coleman, Moral Theories of Torts: Their Scope and Limits: Part
, 2 LAW & PHIL. 5, 12-14 (1983) (suggesting that corrective justice does not require
127
128

that an actor's unjust gains be disgorged to the particular person whom the actor
harmed).
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the victim may value at a price even higher than the goods demanded in the blackmail transaction. For no disclosure is intended and

none occurs. Whateverjustification might support disclosure, none
supports a threat whose only motive and effect is to extract money
13 1
or compliance.
E. ComparingBlackmail with the Ordinary Commercial Transaction
Libertarians who recommend the legalization of blackmail
sometimes claim that there is no way to distinguish blackmail from
an ordinary commercial transaction.13 2 Yet the earlier discussion
made clear there is an economic distinction: the central case
blackmail transaction is nonallocative while the ordinary commercial
exchange is allocative.13 3 I here suggest two additional distinctions, each keyed to the deontological inquiry: first, that the
blackmailer intends to harm; and second, that regardless of intent,
the buyer of silence in an extortion transaction suffers a net harm,
while the buyer in an ordinary commercial transaction is benefit-

ted. 134
1. Intent to Harm
The libertarian might argue that the ordinary buyer and seller
have the same intent as the blackmailer does: that an ordinary
buyer would be delighted to obtain goods without paying, and an
ordinary seller would be delighted to obtain money without giving
up goods. If so, the parties to the commercial transaction have the
"real" or direct intent of extracting money or other advantage-just
like the blackmailer.
Most buyers and sellers, however, would in the long run prefer
not to be exploitative. Perhaps on occasion people might enjoy
131 Some liberties are permitted because they are good in themselves, and some
for other reasons. When a liberty becomes disassociated from the reasons that
justified it, it can be prohibited. Cf. ARTHUR L. GOODHART, ESSAYS INJURISPRUDENCE
AND THE COMMON LAW 179 (1931) (distinguishing between "liberties which the law

recognizes and approves" and "liberties which the law recognizes but disapproves").
Thus disclosure is usually thought permissible because of the public interest in
learning the relevant facts, and other related First Amendment concerns. These
reasons are not available to justify nondisclosure.
132 See 1 MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, MAN, ECONOMY AND STATE: A TREATISE ON
ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 443 n.49 (1962); Murphy, supra note 40, at 23-25.
133 See supra text accompanying note 54.
134 See infra parts IV.E.1-E.2. The discussion in part IV.E.2 also defends a

particular conception of harm.
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getting something for nothing, but most persons' sense of self
respect is probably dependent on at least some degree of reciprocity
in the bulk of their relations.13 5 If this is true (and I believe it is),
then engaging in an ongoing activity that extracts something for
nothing would be less desirable for most of us than engaging in
commercial activity that involves exchanges.
The converse-DDE approach would test this assertion by asking
if it would make a difference to the parties' actions if reciprocity
were eliminated. I believe that for most of us it would make a
difference if one took away the element in exchange that gives
benefits to others. For example, if all young people were given a
choice of engaging in a career involving mutual exchange or in a
career of exploitation, most would probably choose the former even
if success were guaranteed in both. Take away the component of
the buyer or seller's activity that benefits others, and she will find
the activity less attractive; if so, then under the DSE test, part of the
"real" or direct intent is to exchange and not to extract.
Motive is a notoriously difficult basis on which to build
fundamental legal distinctions. 136 This point leads to the second
distinction between blackmail and ordinary commercial transactions:
the ordinary commercial party offers another party a benefit
(regardless of motive), but the blackmailer imposes a harm.
Nothing bars lawgivers from taking less note of motives than
moralists might; it is perfectly acceptable for the law to permit Mr.
Scrooge to engage in badly motivated acts that give others benefits,
and simultaneously to prohibit badly motivated and directly harmful
acts such as blackmail.
2. Harm and Benefit
Defining what should constitute a "harm" or "benefit" is
particularly difficult when an entire transaction is at issue, for the
parties will be differently situated at different times. For example,
it would be futile to define as a benefit the return of something that
the other party stole only a moment before. In order to capture the
meaning of "harm" for an entire transaction, I suggest (building on
135 See generally LAWRENCE C. BECKER, RECIPRocrry 73 (1986) ("Ethnographers,
social anthropologists, historians and sociologists report in unison that people do
'feel' ... [involuntary] obligations. In particular, they feel them toward benefactors."). See also id. at 73-172 (arguing that reciprocity is a fundamental moral virtue
which should guide the design of social structures).
13 I am indebted to Dan Dobbs here.
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the work of Nozick 137 and Fried1 38 ) that a transaction is "harmful" if the following three conditions are satisfied: (1) the thing the
seller wants the buyer/victim to purchase is such that the buyer
would be better off, in regard to that thing, if the seller and his

resources13 9 did not exist, (2) the buyer/victim would be better
off if the transaction were impossible 1 4° and known by all parties

to be impossible, and (3) the buyer/victim has done nothing to the
other party that would give that party a corrective justice right
14
against her.

1

157 This is an adaptation of the conditions Nozick states for an "unproductive"
exchange. See supra text accompanying notes 37-38, 39. It is not fully clear whether
Nozick means his conditions to state part of a deontologic argument (as I interpret
them) or whether he intended them as an economic argument as Lindgren suggests.
See Lindgren, supra note 10, at 699-70. In any event, I have adapted them to the
deontological
framework.
8
13 See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE:

A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL

OBLIGATION 95-99 (1981).
139 Among other changes, I have altered Nozick's first condition (that the victim/
purchaser would be better off in the absence of the seller) in several ways. Most
importantly, in its new form, the first condition requires that the purchaser would be
better off in the absence of the seller or his resources. Without this amendment one
runs afoul of cases in which, for example, a landowner decides to cut off access to a
distant portion of his estate solely to extract entrance fees from the frequent
trespassers who use it as a shortcut. Cf FRIED, supra note 138, at 95-99 (discussing
such cases). With the amended first condition, it is clear that the trespassers are not
"extorted" or harmed when they have to pay for access privileges, for they would not
be better off in the absence of the landowner and his land. Without them, they
would have no shortcut.
Arguably a substitute for the added "resources" lAnguage is Nozick's implicit
third condition that the seller/victim is harmed only if she does not deserve to have
the other inflict on her the threatened harm. See NOZICK, supra note 37, at 84
(implying that the buyer/victim who purchases freedom from harm cannot be said
to have gained nothing if she deserved to be harmed by the seller).
140 The importance of the second condition can be illustrated by considering one
of Lindgren's objections to Nozick. Lindgren interprets Nozick's position as resting
solely on his first condition. See Lindgren, supra note 10, at 699. (This may be a
legitimate interpretation; Nozick's presentation is far from pellucid.) Lindgren then
poses a standard claim-of-right case: "[A]ssume a tree on your land falls into a
highway, striking a passerby. He threatens to sue you unless you pay him money."
Id. Presumably, you would prefer to settle rather than to be sued.
Lindgren correctly notes that Nozick's first condition cannot explain why this is
not blackmail: since the person being sued may wish the other party had not existed,
the first condition for an unproductive exchange is satisfied. See id. But the case
does not satisfy Nozick's second condition. The landowner would be worse off if
settling lawsuits were impossible. Therefore Lindgren's claim-of-right case is not
central case blackmail, and the injured passerby is not harming the landowner if he
extracts money in settlement or suit.
141 See NOZICK, supra note 37, at 84; see also supra notes 38, 39, 139.
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As was suggested in an earlier section of this Article, these three
conditions all appear to be met in cases of central-case blackmail. 142 The third characteristic is present because the centralcase victim has not harmed the blackmailer. The second harmdefining characteristic is present because if exchanges of silence for
money were known to be impossible, the victim would be better off
because the blackmailer would not bother with the transaction. The
first characteristic appears to be satisfied because the victim/buyer
would be better off if the blackmailer and the piece of information
suddenly vanished.
However, part of the first condition concerned the seller's
resources, and I might be challenged to address whether the
information the blackmailer wants to disclose is "his" resource.
James Lindgren argues that blackmail is wrongful because the
information belongs to third parties; 143 others have argued that
blackmail is wrongful because, under a privacy analysis, the
information belongs to the victim; 144 some libertarians think that
blackmail is not wrongful because the information belongs to the
blackmailer.145

My response is simple: it does not matter whose resource the
information is. If the information belongs to third parties or to the
victim, the blackmailer is not selling something he owns, and the
blackmail transaction can be condemned on that ground. But even
if, as libertarians contend, the blackmailer "owns" the information,
it is clear that the purchaser/victim is worse off in a world where
the blackmailer and that resource exist. The blackmailer is
therefore using that information in a way that harms the victim. 146 In the ordinary commercial transaction, Seller (S) offers
142 See supra text accompanying notes 37-41.
143 See Lindgren, supra note 10, at 702-05.
144 See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 40, at 159 (framing, though later criticizing, the
argument that a blackmailer violates a victim's rights "by making into a commodity
and trying to sell back to the victim something which is really his already (his life)").
145 See, e.g., ROTHBARD, supra note 132, at 157 (stating that "a man has no such
objective property as 'reputation'").
146 Notice that my baseline for distinguishingharm from benefit is similar to that
used in the standard tort case. "Harm" to a plaintiff in the usual tort context is
determined by looking to the plaintiff's condition "in the absence of any interaction
with the other party." Susan Rose-Ackerman, I'd RatherBe Liable Than You: A Note
on Property Rules and Liability Rules, 6 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 255, 258 (1986). The
controversial but still dominant "but for" test of causation exemplifies this approach.
Of course, "interaction" requires definition. For example, a tort plaintiff does
not lack actionable harm simply because the defendant had previously done the
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Purchaser (P) some product or service that P wants that P could not
have without paying S (or a supplier similar to S). If S (or a supplier
similar to S) did not exist, P would have to do without the desired
thing. P wants S to exist and make the offer. Conversely, P offers
S money that S could not have without P (or a buyer similar to P).
S wants P to exist and make the offer. S would be worse off if it
were impossible for her to transact with P.
In paradigmatic blackmail, by contrast, the individual selling
silence (SS) is selling the plagued purchaser (PP) an unaffected
reputation, something that PPwould have had but for SS's actions.
SS creates a threat, then offers to remove the threat. If SS (or a
supplier similar to SS) did not exist, PP would have the desired
thing. In the language of traditional explanations of blackmail
law, 147 SS is parasitic upon his victim. In deontologic terms, there
is nothing in SS's actions that bespeaks a concern for PP's welfare
or for PP's goals. To the contrary: SS is treating PP merely as a
means, in a way he would prefer not to be treated.14 8 SS is violating the "impermissibility of self-preference" that lies at the center
149
of Kantian morality.
The distinction between central case blackmail and the ordinary
commercial transaction thus seems fairly secure, on both economic

plaintiff a great service in some unrelated incident. It is necessary to define the
component of the other party's existence that is relevant. I have defined the scope
of the relevant interaction by reference to the very resource whose allocation is at
issue.
147 Hepworth's sociological examination of the British history of blackmail reveals
parasitism or vampirism as a common image associated with blackmail. See MIKE
HEPWORTH, BLACKMAIL: PUBIucrrY AND SECRECY IN EVERYDAY LIFE 25 (1975)
(describing blackmail as a "social evil-a parasitical growth on the otherwise healthy
body of society, sapping its strength and undermining its constitution").
145 A response might be that sometimes the blackmailer has a benign motive and
his offer is indeed welcome to the victim. For example, take ajournalist who comes
across some information that would be painful to a given individual if disclosed. The
information is, perhaps, of no substantive public import, yet "juicy" enough to give
a small boost to the newspaper's circulation. Moved by concern for the individual,
the reporter wishes not to publish; constrained by a fiduciary obligation to his
newspaper, he is unwilling to benefit the individual at the expense of the newspaper.
The reporter may offer to keep the item out of the newspaper provided the individual
monetarily compensates the newspaper for the foregone circulation-boost. Such
blackmail may be unlawful, but it is not condemned by the deontologic principle
described above. Nozick argues such blackmail should be lawful, at least so long as
the price for silence is no greater than what the journalist forgoes by his silence. See
NOZICK, supra note 37, at 85-86. I take no position on this or other instances outside
the domain of central case blackmail.
149 Ernest J. Weinrib, Toward a Moral Theory of Negligence Law, 2 LAW & PHILOS.
37, 49-50 (1983).
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and deontological grounds. Therefore, the primary libertarian
argument against the wrongfulness of blackmail fails.
V. CRIMINALIZATION

The question still remains whether blackmail is the kind of act
that should be criminalized. The deontological discussion above
should have made clear that central case blackmail is a harmful act
that, being unjustified and directly intended, is wrongful. 1 ° As
a wrongful harm, its criminalization is consistent with the liberal
view that only the presence of harm toward others justifies criminal
prohibition. 15 1 It is also fairly clear that central case blackmail is
economically wasteful because it invites expenditures that fail to
make any significant change in the allocation of the contested
information.15 2 Therefore, criminalizing central case blackmail
is probably also consistent withJeffrie Murphy's view that "immoral153
ity plus disutility is a reasonable basis for criminalization."
Although central case blackmail therefore appears eligible for
potential criminalization, the question of whether blackmail should
in fact be criminalized requires further analysis. For example, if
one took an economic approach to criminalization, one would want
to investigate factors such as the extent of the harm caused by
blackmail (either by the blackmailer or by the victim's use of selfhelp), the extent to which criminalizing blackmail would decrease
these harms, and whether the decrease in harm is likely to outweigh
attendant enforcement costs. Though economics is not the whole
of the matter, it will be useful to discuss some of these issues.
150 See supra text accompanying notes 80-87.
151 The liberal view that only the presence of harm toward others justifies criminal
prohibition is associated historically withJohn Stuart Mill and more recently withJoel
Feinberg. See MILL, supra note 64, at 91-92; see also JOEL FEINBERG, 4 THE MORAL
LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARMLESS WRONGDOING 238 (1990) (exploring
whether outlawing blackmail "satisfies the requirements of the harm principle").
152 See supra text accompanying notes 48-53.
153 Murphy, supra note 40, at 163 (emphasis omitted). Admittedly, the utilitarian
and economic inquiries are not identical, but I suspect the utilitarian case against
blackmail is even stronger than the economic one.
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A. The Effects of Blackmail Law on Victim Behavior
and Perceptions

The effects that blackmail law might have on the behavior of
potential defendants has been much discussed. 154 It is important
to note that criminalization also has an impact on blackmail victims,
providing them with two tools to encourage and assist them in
resisting the blackmailer's demands. 155 The first tool the law
provides is counter-leverage. The second is anger.
1. Counter-leverage
One imagines that were blackmail a tort, the victim would be
unlikely to sue because of a fear that any trial of her suit would
entail release of the embarrassing information which the victim
wishes to keep secret. Unless in camera proceedings were easily
available and enforceable, the information would come out; this
disincentive to bringing suit would seem to provide one of the
reasons why criminalization rather than a simple tort right is
necessary if the law is to deter blackmail. Yet it is also commonly
thought that when blackmail is criminal, victims are unlikely to
report the crime out of a similar fear that prosecution would entail
release of the embarrassing information. 156 Nevertheless, anecdotal evidence seems to be available suggesting that persons
threatened with blackmail may have some hope of maintaining
157
confidentiality even if they report the crime.

154

Prohibiting blackmail may deter directly or may encourage character-formation

that discourages bad acts. By contrast, legalization might not only increase the threatrelated use of information already possessed, but might also increase the expenditures
made on acquiring new information. Thus, criminalizing blackmail has an obvious
goal of discouraging potential blackmailers from undertaking blackmail and blackmail
attempts. Therefore, although blackmail law may fail to serve an individual who has
the unfortunate luck to be the chosen prey of one of the few undeterred bad actors,
the number of bad acts-and thus the number of victims-may be reduced by such law.

155 These tools are available whenever blackmail is unlawful, including instances
beyond the central case of blackmail; whether the tools should be available is part of
the question which needs to be answered whenever a type of blackmail is made
unlawful.
'56 See HEPWORTH, supra note 147, at 22 (by implication). The specific constitutional right to "public" trials in criminal matters, see U.S. CONST. amend. VI, would
make secrecy of the proceedings even more unlikely than in the civil context.
157 See HEPWORTH, supranote 147, at 22-24 (noting that authorities in England are
often willing to preserve confidentiality). One can question the empirical assumption
that victims would in fact be as fearful of initiating a criminal prosecution as of
bringing a civil suit. For example, the prevalence of plea bargaining in the criminal
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But determining how large a percentage of blackmail attempts
are reported to the police is largely beside the point. The ability to
threaten to go to the police may be more important than actually
going to them. By threatening to go to the authorities if and only if
disclosure is made, victims can discourage blackmailers from disclosing the contested information.1 58 This is what Joel Feinberg
terms "counterblackmail." 159 The presence of counterblackmail
makes criminalization important even if victims prior to disclosure
are unwilling to seek the authorities' aid.
The law that criminalizes blackmail itself supplies to all victims
the law
a chip needed to engage in such counterblackmail:
transforms the fact that the blackmail attempt has been made into
information that could, if disclosed, subject the blackmailer to
criminal prosecution. Essentially, the victim may tell the blackmailer that he will be reported unless he withdraws his unlawful threat.
Unlike the blackmailer, who uses the threat of disclosure to
force the victim to give up something (for example, money) to
which the blackmailer has no right, the victim engaging in counterblackmail is using her threat to enforce her rights-to force the
blackmailer to cease his wrongful behavior towards her. Since this
is the victim's "own chip," 160 and the use of the chip as leverage
is neither "unproductive" nor an "unjustified harming," 161 the
victim should be permitted to make this counter-threat. Further,
whether or not a state allows counterblackmail, it is hard to believe
that a prosecutor would use her discretion to prosecute a victim
who used counterblackmail to block continuing threats.
Given the criminalization of blackmail, then, the blackmailer and
the assertive victim appear to be at a standoff: the blackmailer
area might obviate the need for a public trial, and police could then keep the delicate
information confidential.
158 This point is also made by Posner and Shavell, though they differ with regard
to its significance. See Richard A. Posner, Blackmail, Privacy and Freedom of Contract,
141 U. PA. L. REV. 1817, 1837 (1993) (arguing that "[A] blackmailer cannot easily
conceal his identity from the blackmail victim .... Once the victim knows who the
blackmailer is, he has as potent a secret as the blackmailer"); Steven Shavell, An
Economic Analysis of Threats and their Illegality: Blackmail, Extortion, and Robbely, 141
U. PA. L. REV. 1877, 1890 (1993) (noting that "it is frequently difficult to obtain
evidence that a blackmailer made a threat").
159 FEINBERG, supra note 151, at 268.
160 Lindgren, supra note 10, at 707.
161 It is also not central case blackmail. Among other things, the victim did not
acquire the information for the purpose of extracting an advantage from the
threatener.
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threatens to disclose unless money is paid, and the victim threatens
to disclose unless the blackmailer abandons his threat. The victim's
threat to disclose the blackmailer's threat may prevail as most
credible, 162 for the blackmailer knows that if he discloses the
victim will have nothing to lose. What would in fact occur case-bycase probably depends, inter alia, on the participants' strength of
will, and on the level of the various positive and negative payoffs.

16 3

But it seems clear that the criminalization of blackmail

can serve as a tool to foil blackmail attempts in at least some
instances.
Counter-leverage has another virtue as well. The possibility that
offended persons will resort to violent self-help has always been part
of the rationale for instituting legal rights, 164 and it has been
suggested that blackmail should be made criminal lest victims have
no choice but to employ violence and other undesirable self-help
efforts against those who threaten them. The availability of
counterblackmail not only tends to remove the occasion for self-help
by potentially discouraging some blackmail attempts before they
begin, but also gives the victim an alternative self-help weapon to
protect herself, one that is much less destructive and disruptive to
society as a whole than violence.
2. Anger
As Judge Posner has suggested, only sophisticated victims may
be able to take advantage of the leverage that counterblackmail can
provide. 165 But criminalization of blackmail has another function
that is useful even for the unsophisticated victim. It reinforces her
sense that she has a "right" to be free of such threats, and thus
162 Tape recording a blackmail threat may provide the victim strong evidence.
However, whether a victim can lawfully tape a blackmailer's telephoned threats may
depend, inter alia, on whether counterblackmail is lawful. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510(4), 2511(2)(d) (1988) (a party to a communication may make "aural
acquisition" of it except "for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act").
163 Examples of possible payoffvariables include, among others, the degree of the
victim's fear of disclosure, the amount of money demanded by the blackmailer, and
the degree of the blackmailer's fear of disclosure (which will in turn be affected by
how much evidence the victim has). For a useful discussion of strategic variables in
the blackmail context, see Russell Hardin, Blackmailingfor Mutual Good, 141 U. PA.
L. REV. 1787 (1993); Shavell, supra note 158.
164 See, e.g., Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 342 P.2d 790, 796 (Or. 1959), cert.
denied, 362 U.S. 918 (1960) (arguing that the trespass tort was historically seen "partly
at least as a means of discouraging disruptive influences in the community").
165 See Posner, supra note 158, at 1836-37.
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reinforces her willingness to angrily refuse the blackmailer's
demands. Since a central case blackmailer has no incentive of his
own to disclose, little may be required to dissuade him from
166
disclosing; even unreasoned resistance may suffice.
Many commentators have noted that the legal prohibition of
blackmail does not serve the interest of the victim who, in instances
where the prohibition fails to deter, would prefer payment to disclosure. 167 That is true. The image on which the blackmail prohibition rests is a quite different type of victim, one who is put into
mental pain and fear by blackmail threats, 168 but who will nevertheless have no truck with dishonor. The image suggests a person
should not be so ashamed of her past or so unwilling to face the
169
truth that she would give in to ignoble manipulation.
"Honor" can be given a utilitarian construction: it is behavior
170
that helps the collective even if it hurts the immediate actor.
166 If his threat fails, and if he is not in the business of making future threats

credible, he has no reason to disclose; in fact, blackmail's unlawfulness gives him a
good reason to lay low. Cf. supra part V.A.1 (discussing counter-leverage). A
thoughtful blackmailer may recognize that the probability that a victim will go to the
police may increase dramatically after disclosure is made, even in cases where the
victim was not originally aware of the option.
167 See e.g., Lindgren, supra note 10, at 680-97 (discussing several commentators'
theories of when a victim pays for information).
8
'6 See HEPWORTH, supra note 147, at 19 (noting a judge's view of blackmail as
"'slow death'" (quoting THE TIMES (LONDON), Apr. 2, 1924 (Justice McCardle))); id.
at 21 (characterizing blackmail as "'moral murder'"); id. at 22 (stating that the
blackmailer's "ennervating [sic] and relentless pressure allegedly produced a state of
suicidal despair").
169 This may seem to contradict the stereotypical victim's almost mortal weakness
described by Hepworth's researches. See supra note 168. But Hepworth recognizes
that "by going to the police it was possible to stave off the appalling effects of moral
murder." Id. at 23.
Hepworth quotes an aphorism stating that "Blackmail is possible only when
individuals are discreditable." Id. at 7 (quoting LAUD HUMPHREYS, OUT OF THE
CLOSETS (1972)). This apparently assumes that the discreditable behavior necessary
for a successful blackmail is the behavior that occurred some time in the past-the
behavior the blackmailer has uncovered and now threatens to reveal. My argument
is that blackmail is possible only when individuals exhibit discreditable behavior at the
time of the blackmail threat because the honorable course of action at that time is to
resist.
This notion of resistance appears occasionally in Hepworth's historical accounts
of blackmail incidents. A news report of a nineteenth century blackmail trial stated:
"It was not everyone who had the courage to come into court and show the absolute
falsehood of the accusation made [by the blackmailer]; but Earl Carrington had done
that, and he had performed a great service to the public in so doing." HEPWORTH,
supra note 147, at 26 (quoting THE TIMES, Nov. 13, 1897). (It is not entirely clear
whether the quoted language is that of the Times reporter or of the trial judge.)
170 1 am indebted to Warren Schwartz for this argument. See Warren Schwartz et
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If one assumes that acts of blackmail impose net costs on society, 171 then the socially beneficial response to a blackmailer is to
resist in order to convince potential blackmailers that blackmail
never succeeds, and thus to silence their threats. 172 Upholding
the image of an honorable and resistant victim may be worth the
cost to those occasional victims who are not convinced by the image
and want to give in.
The law may not only provide the honorable resister with
counterblackmail as a means to resist blackmailers, but may also
give her the psychological energy to resist. Sometimes we legislate
17 3
against something in order to keep our sense of outrage alive.
Blackmail law may fall into this category. If the law permitted
blackmail transactions, blackmail's perceived moral status might be
transformed: gradually it might come to seem acceptable to us as
observers, blackmailers, or victims, that a victim should pay. If so,
persons who are blackmailed might become less effective in fighting
back. The law may have an effect not only on potential criminals,

al., The Duel: Can These Gentlemen Be Acting Efficiently?, 13J. LEGAL STUD. 321, 331

(1984).
Recall that most economists assume that allowing blackmail will result in "digging
up dirt only to rebury it again." See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text. This
in turn assumes that the only factor that will matter to victims is a comparison of the
price the blackmailer is demanding with the reputational cost of disclosure. That is,
the primary economic analysis of blackmail assumes that victims will act with a
particular and narrow set of self-interested economic motives. A victim with
utilitarian or deontologic motives, by contrast, might act in a way that furthers the
interest of society without furthering his own economically defined self-interest.
171 One might argue, however, that blackmail is beneficial in the information it
reveals, but this would not apply to the central case which usually results in the
purchase of silence. One might also argue blackmail is a useful tool for "keeping
people honest" and increasing the social costs of bad action; this point might be
relevant in assessing the costs and benefits of outlawing central case blackmail. See
supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
172 From a deontologic perspective, resistance to evil is a fundamental virtue. See
BECKER, supra note 135, at 74-76, 97-101, 146-50. The victim who accedes to tyranny
today exposes other victims to vulnerability tomorrow. Furthermore, buying silence
is an evil in a way that being silent may not be. Passively hiding awkward facts-for
example, choosing to live a creditable life in a new town after serving a criminal
sentence-does not "use" others in the way that a deliberate decision to conceal may
do. Finally, in buying silence, one also shows insufficient respect for one's self. To
pay to hide something about one's self may be a shaming act inconsistent with human
flourishing. Cf. Radin, supra note 23, at 1906 (arguing that understanding integral
aspects of our personal lives as "monetizable or completely detachable from the
person... is to do violence to our deepest understanding of what it is to be human").
173 Cf CALABRESI, supra note 102, at 16 (exploring "what it does to the state and
to all of us" to have the state making explicit tradeoffs between life and other values).
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but also on potential victims and on their sense of what their own
best behavior should be.
If blackmail is criminalized, by contrast, it helps maintain a
sense of outrage as a weapon against blackmail. As in any bilateral
monopoly situation, it is the person who "won't budge," and can
credibly convince the other that she won't in fact budge, who wins.
Several commentators have suggested the blackmail bargain is often
irrational-a last gasp effort to stave off nearly inevitable catastrophe, in which the victim will almost always be the long-term
loser.1 74 If so, anger may be the best antidote to panic. Anger is
a passionate emotion, yet, ironically, in this context it may be the
best preserver of rationality.
The following discussion, though tentative, will suggest some
reasons why this may be the case. The blackmailer brings up
something embarrassing or private. It is a shaming experience to
have such facts brought up by a hostile party. (Raised by a friend,
the same issues' exposure can lead to increased intimacy rather than
shame.) Shame can inhibit both justified anger and the selfconfidence necessary for self-protection. 175 Yet, as the Sabini and
Silver analysis 176 of the Milgram experiments 177 showed, sometimes one needs confidence in one's self-willfulness, unwillingness
to go along-in order to do right under pressure. The potential
174 See David Owens, Should Blackmail Be Banned?, 63 PHIL. 501, 511-13 (1988)

(arguing that a victim of blackmail is forced to choose between two losing options);
see also Murphy, supra note 40, at 166 ("Blackmail and the privacy invasions it invites
tend to lead to harassment that is unending in nature.").
175 Shame tends to encourage conformity. The hostile stranger's revelation can
thus increase both the intensity of the victim's psychological need to please the
community and with it her desperation to avoid further disclosures that would make
the community cast her out. Further, if the information regards moral or other
weakness, then the blackmailed person may feel less entitled to fight on her own
behalf.
176
JOHN SABINI & MAURY SILVER, MORALIES OF EVERYDAY LIFE 55-87 (1982).

Extrapolating from the cruelty inflicted by World War II's concentration
camps, Stanley Milgram tested the extent to which the ordinary person would be
willing to "follow orders" even if following orders meant inflicting pain. Experimental
subjects were told to administer electric shocks of increasing intensity on other people
(supposedly fellow experimental subjects, but in actuality colleagues of the
experimenter), supposedly as part of a psychology experiment investigating the
impact that pain has on learning. See STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY
13-26 (1974). On the experimenter's orders, a surprisingly high number ofpersonsup to 65% of the experimental subjects, see id. at 35 (table 2)-pushed the levers that
supposedly inflicted pain (marked "Danger: Severe Shock" and "XXX"), even after
the "subject" had begun to scream, pled to be let go, or feigned unconsciousness. See
id. at 22.
177
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victim needs her sense of outrage to fight off the wound to selfesteem inflicted by the blackmailer, a wound that itself might impair
her overall capacity for moral action.
Sabini and Silver suggest, quite rightly, that an actor's ability to
act morally is often undermined by her inability to trust herself. 178 The tale of one's own unpleasant past deeds might surely
undermine self-trust. It also may undermine one's sense of one's
own self-interest. The knowledge that the blackmailer is acting
unlawfully may bolster the victim's sense of outraged pride and selfworth when she most needs such psychological assistance.
Legal commentary that questions the utility of blackmail law may
underestimate the value of pride. Our society as a whole may
underestimate its value as well. Compare for example the Christian
ethos with Aristotle's. Christian doctrine says turn the other
cheek; 179 Aristotle said that one who takes a blow without returning it is a slave.1 80 The prideful victim is one who will resist
1 81
others' bad acts.
178 Sabini and Silver suggest essentially that immoral acts can result when we
identify morality with an externally-imposed constraint on our desires, and identify
sin with what we desire to do. See SABINI & SILVER, supra note 176, at 67-69. When
this happens, our "crossed wires" may leave us virtually helpless when confronted by
a situation where the moral impulse is internal ("I don't want to hurt these people")
and the immorality is coming from the external authority (the experimenter giving
orders to the experimental subjects, or the concentration-camp commandant giving
orders to new guards). See id. In such situations, every moral impulse comes in the
guise of temptation, and every immoral order comes in the guise of duty, so it can
be hard to tell them apart. See id. In these situations, following one's internal
impulses would lead to more moral action than obeying the unpleasant order, but
that requires a degree of self-trust.
179 See Matthew 5:39-40 (The New English Bible, 2d ed. 1970) ("But what I tell you
is this: Do not set yourself against the man who wrongs you. If someone slaps you
on the right cheek, turn and offer him your left.")
' 80 See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHics § 15, at 124 (Martin Oswald trans., 1962)
("People seek either to requite evil with evil-for otherwise their relation is regarded
as that of slaves-or good with good, for otherwise there is no mutual contribution.")
Actually, it maybe that the Christian ethos also does not invariably demand forgiving
nonresistance. See Luke 17:3 (The New English Bible, 2d ed. 1970) ("If your brother
wrongs, reprove him; and if he repents, forgive him.") (emphasis added). It takes both
pride and courage to reprove the powerful.
181 See BECKER, supra note 135, at 74-76, 97-101, 146-50 (arguing that resistance
to evil is a virtue).
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B. Implicationsfor Enforcement Costs
The two tools provided by blackmail laws-counter-leverage and
anger-involve a fairly inexpensive form of self-help. When
successfully employed, they can foil blackmail attempts without
violence, intensive private investment, or the use of police or courts.
To the extent that criminalization makes possible the effective use
of counter-leverage and anger, enforcement costs will be reduced.
The lower the costs of enforcement, the more desirable (other
things being equal) the criminalization of blackmail.
CONCLUSION:

A COMMENT ON INTERRELATIONSHIPS

Would victims' resistance-sparked perhaps by anger, a sense of
honor,1 8 2

a

moral

preference,1 83

or

pride-undermine

the

"waste" argument of Coase, Ginsburg and Shechtman, Daly and
Giertz, and Epstein?18 4 The waste argument was premised on the
assumption that blackmail would not cause any allocative effects
because the victim would always buy silence, while the instant
discussion suggests that honorable and angry persons would not buy
silence. An economist wants the most accurate measure of the
demand function available; the motivation of the demand is less
important than the result.
Blackmail attempts are likely to have few allocative effects on the
distribution of information even in the presence of a sense of
honor, so long as blackmail is unlawful. This is because the counterleverage provided by the legal prohibition makes it risky for the
blackmailer to reveal it.
If blackmail is lawful, however, counter-blackmail disappears as
an option. If in a significant number of victims the sense of honor
It may still be possible for an economic analysis to fully take into account the
notion of honor. For interesting explorations of the interplay that can exist between
instrumentalist and deontologic beliefs, see CALABRESI, supra note 102; GUIDo
182

CALABRESI & PHILLp'BOBBrIr, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978); Schwartz et al., supra note

170.
183 By the victim's "moral" preference, then, I mean to indicate a demand
structure in which resistance-plus-disclosure has a positive value for the victim, even
in circumstances where the blackmailer is willing to accept an amount of money less
than the amount of damage the disclosure will do to the victim's reputation.
Conceivably, even an economically self-interested agent might possess such a

preference pattern. But at least at this juncture, what we think of as nondeontic
moral beliefs seem a more likely basis for explaining why persons in such circumstances might prefer disclosure to buying silence.
184 See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text (discussing the waste argument).
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and anger survives the erosion that legalization might initiate, then
that partially undoes the assumption on which the arguments of
Daly & Giertz et alia are premised. 185 The victim's willingness to
pay would no longer be a function solely of the damage disclosure
could do; she might be unwilling to pay despite significant destructive potential. In such an event, blackmail attempts could spark
allocative changes in the distribution of information.
To the extent that criminalizing blackmail would deprive third
parties of information that would be disclosed if blackmail were
lawful, the costs and benefits of such foregone disclosure would
have to be assessed and incorporated into the economists' analysis
of blackmail law. The economic analysis would become more
complex.
From a deontological perspective, however, it would not matter
whether or not blackmail attempts would sometimes result in
beneficial disclosures of information. The doctrine of double effect
indicates that a person making extorsive threats cannot escape
moral condemnation by pointing to unintended beneficial sideeffects of her behavior. Thus, to the extent that the desire to resist
blackmail is a fact of human psychology, the accounts of central case
blackmail provided by economic and deontologic theorists might
diverge.
Perhaps we finally have, if not a paradox, an irony. When
victims act as deontological moral agents, they resist, and a
government applying a deontological approach would aid their
resistance by deciding that blackmail is wrongful and should be
discouraged. When victims act as narrowly-defined economic agents
(motivated by the Daly-Giertz demand structure), a government
applying economic logic would recognize that blackmail is wasteful
and similarly decide that it should be discouraged. Thus, a nation
that is ruled by the same single-gauge principles as its people would
outlaw blackmail. But when the motives of a significant portion of
the victim population are moral rather than economic, and the
government applies an economic logic in ordering legal relations,
it is then that the deontological and consequential logics may lead
to diverging recommendations. It may be that the two accounts are
185 See supra text accompanying note 51 (discussing the assumption by Daly and
Giertz that the victim's willingness to pay for silence is solely a function of the
reputational damage the blackmailer is capable of inflicting).

TRUTH AND CONSEQUENCES

1785

most likely to converge, ironically, when the economic account fails
to take account of the other's effects.
Postscript

Ironies aside, I want to acknowledge that the sharp distinctions
made in this paper between consequentialism and deontology are
merely a mode of facilitating discourse. The final judgment on
blackmail law (or any law) should depend neither on consequentialism nor on deontologic morality, but on some as yet unstated
combination of the two. A primary task for normative theory is to
provide a satisfactory integration of the objective and subjective
viewpoints1 86 that, together, appeal to us as constitutive of morali-

186 See NAGEL, supra note 88, at 185-88.

